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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(3)(a)
("The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ... over a judgment of the Court of
Appeals."). Petitioners seek review of the Court of Appeals' deci
sion in Judd v. Bowen, 2017 UT App 56, 397 P.3d 686, issued on March 30, 2017.
~

An order granting certiorari was issued on August 25, 2017.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court granted certiorari on the following issues:
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining the Judds were not entitled to
a prescriptive easement for temporary parking. This Court "review[s] the decision
of the court of appeals . . . for correctness, ceding no deference to the court of
appeals." Watkins v. Ford, 2013 UT 31, if 18, 304 P.3d 841.
~

2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its rulings concerning the scope of the
prescriptive easement for access. This Court "review[s] the decision of the court of
appeals ... for correctness, ceding no deference to the court of appeals." Watkins

v. Ford, 2013 UT 31, if 18,304 P.3d 841.
Both of these issues were a central part to the findings and judgment entered by the
trial court. See, e.g., Findings,

,r,r 18-20, 22, 25-26, 31

[R. 1123-25]; Judgment, ,r,r 6 -

8 [R.1314]. These issues were also discussed at length before the Court of Appeals and
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reviewed by the Court of Appeals in its decision. Thus, they are preserved for argument
before this Court.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
None.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This dispute arises out of the use of a parking area located between two adjacent
cabins ("Cabins") in Big Cottonwood Canyon near the Brighton ski resort. The property
for each of the two Cabins was acquired in the early 1900s by Augusta Winters Grant and
Susa Young Gates, respectively. Over the years, those Cabins have passed down through
the respective families.

Currently, one Cabin (the "Judd Cabin") is owned by the

Petitioners and the other Cabin (the "Bowen Cabin") is now owned by Respondent. Over
the years, owners of both Cabins have accessed them by way of a dirt road that leads from
the main Brighton road to the edge of the Bowen property. This dirt road is not in dispute
and is not owned by either of the parties to this appeal. From the end of the dirt access
road, users of the two Cabins historically entered upon a large oval area located mostly on
the Bowen property (which the trial court called "the Circular Driveway'' but which for the
purposes of this case is better defined as the "Easement Area"), in order to park while using
the Cabins. To aid the Court, aerial photographs marked at trial as Exhibits 3-6, 8-9, which

2
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visually show the nature of the Easement Area over its many years of use, are attached in
the Addendum.
The Easement Area is located immediately adjacent to and in-between the two
Cabins, with a small portion of the Easement Area located on the Judd property. From at
least 1935 to 2008, the owners of the two Cabins and their guests have used the Easement
Area for access and parking because there was no other access or parking for the Judds
outside of the Easement Area.

In 2006, Respondent David Bowen acquired all interests in the Bowen Cabin
property and became the sole owner. Prior to that time, there had been no objection to the
Judds' use of the Easement Area for access and parking thereon. Commencing in 2008
and continuing over the next few years, Bowen began installing a chain and other
barricades across the access points to and within the Easement Area to prevent the Judds
from accessing and using the same. Bowen has also allowed substantial foliage to grow
on and over the Easement Area, affecting access and parking on such area.
Bowen Cabin users had historically parked their vehicles off the Easement Area
immediately adjacent to the Bowen Cabin. After purchasing their Cabin, users of the
Bowen Cabin abandoned those parking spots and began parking on the Easement Area,
effectively blocking usage of the Easement Area by the Judd Cabin users with their
vehicles.
~

ts
3
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COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Following unsuccessful attempts to amicably resolve the matter, the Judds filed suit
in 2011, claiming a prescriptive easement to the Easement Area for access and parking.
After a four-day bench trial, during which time trial court listened to over twenty witnesses
with personal knowledge of the historic access, parking, and mutual cooperation by all
owners of the two Cabins and considered dozens of photos (including multiple historic
aerial pictures), and after making an on-site visit to the Cabin properties, the trial court
found:
1. Petitioners had acquired a prescriptive easement for both access and parking on
the Easement Area [R. 1127];
2. the Easement Area was defined in terms of its historic use, determining its
boundaries according to witness testimony and aerial photographs [R. 1123-24];
3. that the Easement Area was the only way to gain vehicular access to the Judd
Cabin [R. 1123-24];
4. that historically, the Easement Area was the only place the Judds could park [R.
1123-24];
5. that historically, the Easement Area was much larger than its post-2008
restricted configuration (due to post 2006 overgrowth of foliage in the Easement
Area) [R. 1123-24];
6. that Bowen's subsequent installation of "gates, barricades, rocks, decorative
lighting, and recently-grown foliage" prohibited entirely the Judds' "historic
access and use." [R 1126-27].
4
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7. that the Judd Cabin users should try to install some parking areas adjacent to
their cabin so that their use of the Easement Area would lessen any impact on
the Bowen Cabin users [R 1127, 1315].
8. Having determined that the Judds had acquired a prescriptive easement for
access and parking to and over the Easement Area, the trial court in a subsequent
hearing on November 14, 2014, ordered Bowen to restore the Easement Area to
its historic configuration so as to not interfere with the Judds' use of their
prescriptive easement. [R.1892-1895.] Bowen appealed. [R.1901-1902.]

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Bowen argued that the trial court erred in
granting any prescriptive easement rights to Petitioners. Judd v. Bowen, 2017 UT App 56,
iJ 1, 397 P.3d 686. The Court of Appeals determined:
1. that the Judds had established a prescriptive easement, but limited the use of the
easement to access only. Id. iJ 68;
2. that the Judds would not be allowed to park on the Easement Area. Id.;
3. that the Bowen Cabin users could park on the Easement Area, thus creating yet
another impediment to the Judds' historic use of the Easement Area Id. iJ62;
4. while it is "possible" to acquire a parking easement, such a result was not
applicable in this case, because an easement for temporary parking by the Bowen
Cabin users on the "narrow road" that has "very limited land available on or
immediately adjacent" thereto, was more akin to a possessory right obtained
~

through adverse possession because it would deprive the Bowens of "exercising
5
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the rights inherent in their ownership." Id.

ilil 53, 55;

5. that Bowen had no obligation to restore the Easement Area to its historic
condition. Id. ,I 69.
This Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in
failing to recognize the full scope of the easement and in denying a prescriptive easement
for temporary parking. This Court also granted Bowen's cross-petition challenging the
very existence of the access easement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Both the Judd Cabin and the Bowen Cabin are accessed from the Brighton public

road by way of a dirt access road. [R.1123.]

2.

The dirt access road, which terminates at the western edge of the Bowen property,

is the only means of access to the Judd and Bowen Cabins. [R.1123.]
3.

Continuing from the termination point of the dirt access road off the main Brighton

public road, access to the two Cabins is over the Easement Area, constituting a circular
area between the two Cabins located largely on the Bowen property. [R. 1123-24; Exhibit
2.]
4.

During a period of more than 20 years, and in fact more than 70 years prior to 2008,

the Easement Area was much larger than its current configuration. [R.1123, 1314.]
5.

Historic aerial photographs admitted into evidence identified the parameters of the

Circular Drive as it had existed and been used throughout more than 70 years. [R.1123-24,
1314.]
6
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~

6.

Historically, from at least 1935 through 2008, people visiting the Judd Cabin parked

on the outer edge or in the center portion of the Easement Area, because there was nowhere
else to park. [R.1124, Exhibits 3-6, 8-9.]

7.

Because of changes to the Easement Area made by Bowen from and after 2008, cars

are now physically unable to park in the center portion, or on the outer edge, of the
Easement Area. [R.1124]
8.

Historically for more than 70 years and up until 2008, the Easement Area was the

sole access and parking area for the Judds. [R. 1124; Exhibits 3-6, 8-9.]
9.

1

Aerial photographs admitted into evidence and witness testimony established that,

historically, when vehicles were parked on the Easement Area, they did not block the
passage of other vehicles. [R.1123-25, Exhibits 3-6, 8-9.]

1

The following testimony supports the trial court's rulings in this regard: C. Allen: R.
1918 56:2-6 ([The Easement Area was used] "every time, it was the only place to go. There
was nowhere else to go."); R. 64: 17-22 (verifying the historic use of the Easement Area
for access and parking from 1971 through2008); R. 70:15-19, 73:1-10 (no alternate access,
only access is Easement Area); J. Williams: R. 1918 79:24-25, 80:1-2 (used Easement
Area and parked on the Easement Area "every time" in the 1940s); R. 81: 15-17 (personally
observed other Judd Cabin users using Easement Area from 1978 to 2006, "It's the only
way you could get out."); R. Judd: R. 1918 91:1-13 (use of Easement Area involved use
of the "entire" Easement Area 95% of the time. "There was really no area to turn around
without."); R. 89:5-16 (verified use from early 1960s to 2008); P. Johnson: R. 1918 117:311, 118:22-25, 119:1-11 (verifying that from 1935 to 2008, the Judds "routinely'' used the
Easement Area, it was the "normal way'' for visitors to enter and exit the Cabin); K.
Harlan: R. 1919 53:19-25, 54:1-7 (the Judds drove around Easement Area "all the time");
R. 50:14-25 (verifying the Judds' use ofEasement Area from 1976 to 2008); D. Clark: R.
1918 15 5: 11-14 (cars went all the way around the Easement Area to enter and exit 100%
of the time); R. 150:13-19 (verified use from the 1950s); C. Hardy: R. 1919 13:4-8 (use
of the entire Easement Area to exit and enter "every time"); R. 14: 1-7 (common occurrence
that others used entire circle); R. 7:22-25 (verifying use from the late 1950s); L. Hawkins:
R. 1919 40:5-12 (used Easement Area regularly from 1968 to about 2008).
7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10.

Currently, because of growth of vegetation on the Easement Area in recent years,

the available space for vehicles on the Easement Area is wide enough for only one vehicle
to travel, thus not allowing any parking without blocking other vehicles. [R.1123.]
11.

Historically, visitors to the Bowen Cabin parked on a driveway off of the Easement

Area and immediately west of the Bowen Cabin to park their cars. Commencing sometime
around 2008, Bowen eliminated those historic parking spots, created a walking path
outlined with decorative rocks and thereafter has parked only in the Easement Area. [R.
1124.]
12.

Prior to Bowen's acquisition of the Bowen property in 2006, no one owning an

interest in the Bowen property objected to the use of the Easement Area for access and
parking by users of the Judd Cabin. [R.1125-26.]
13.

Commencing around 2008, Bowen installed gates, barricades, rocks, landscape

lighting, and other barriers designed to prohibit the Judds' use of the Easement Area.
[R.1126.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Although the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's ruling that the
Judds established a prescriptive easement to the Easement Area, it incorrectly focused on
the condition of the Easement Area post 2008. Thus, although it properly recognized that
the terms of a prescriptive easement are defined by the area and use during the prescriptive
period, the Court of Appeals seems to have ignored that historical use.

8
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ijy

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals sharply restricted the scope and nature of the
Easement Area. It also improperly denied the prescriptive temporary parking easement
granted by the trial court on the basis that such an easement would be tantamount to
granting the Judds possessory rights outside the scope of an easement.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the required minimum period of20 years
of prescriptive easement use was established many years ago. In fact, the use of the
Easement Area began no later than 193 5 and continued uninterrupted until at least early
2008, a period of over 70 years. During all of those years, the Judds used the Easement
Area for access and parking. It was inconsistent of the Court of Appeals to find that the
historic use allows for a prescriptive easement for access but to then deny the historic
parking rights of Judd Cabin users on exactly the same facts. If access for over 70 years
created a prescriptive access easement for the purpose of access, the same 70 years of
parking established a prescriptive easement for parking.

If the Court of Appeals had appropriately viewed the Easement Area as defined by
the trial court, the conclusions and rulings of the Court of Appeals would be different.
Correctly defined, the Judds' prescriptive parking easement would not change Bowen's
use of his property from how it has been used historically. The trial court based its findings
on the historic size and use of the Easement Area after hearing the testimony of some
twenty witnesses, reviewing many exhibits (including historic aerial photos, some of which
showed cars parked on the Easement Area), and making an on-site visit to the Cabin
properties. Key witnesses were elderly and gave testimony about their personal visits to
the Judd Cabin from and after the 1930s and 1940s-including their substantial knowledge

9
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of historic parking in the Easement Area. The findings by the trial court and the decisions
of many cases from other jurisdictions support the right of a prescriptive parking easement.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of a prescriptive easement for
temporary parking. This Court should reinstate the trial court's rulings regarding the scope
of the easement and the requirements it imposed on Bowen to remove impediments to the
Easement Area.

ARGUMENT

I.

The Judds Established a prescriptive easement in the size and scope
found by the trial court.

As this Court has previously explained, "[a] prescriptive easement is created when
the party claiming the prescriptive easement can prove that 'use of another's land was open,
continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for a period of twenty years."' Nyman v.

Anchor Dev., LLC, 2003 UT 27,

if 18,

73 P.3d 357 (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d

1254, 1258 (Utah 1998)). Further, "the extent of a prescriptive easement is measured and
limited by its historic use during the prescriptive period." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305, 312 (Utah 1998). As the Court of Appeals acknowledged in this case, "[t]his m~ans
that the purpose for which the easement was acquired limits both the extent of the easement
right granted as well as the physical boundaries of the easement itself." Judd v. Bowen,
2017 UT App 56, if 58, 397 P.3d 686 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 2

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, citing it eight times
throughout its opinion.
2
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The trial court concluded, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that the Judds
established a prescriptive easement. [R.1121] Judd, 2017 UT App 56,

,r,r 18, 24, 26, 32-

33. The trial court found that the Judds used the Easement Area, an area larger than the
current configuration, for access and parking "continuously since the early l 900s."
[R.1127.]
Because the Judds demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that they met the
elements of a prescriptive easement, the trial court correctly awarded a prescriptive
easement over the historic size and scope of the Easement Area-not the current restricted
size of Easement Area due to recent overgrowth of foliage. [R.1314-1316]

II.

~

The Court of Appeals incorrectly denied the Judds' prescriptive
easement for parking the trial court correctly found and granted.

Although the Court of Appeals agreed that the Judds had established a prescriptive
easement, it restricted the easement to access and reversed the trial court's award of a
prescriptive easement for parking. Judd, 2017 UT App 56, ,r 34. This was error.
Although the Court of Appeals implied that a prescriptive parking easement may be
acquired under certain conditions, it declined to do so in this instance and reversed the trial
court's conclusion that Judds had acquired such an easement through historic use. Judd,
2017 UT App 56, ,r,r 34, 36, 58. It is inconsistent to allow for an access easement based on
the historic use of the Easement Area but deny an easement for parking under exactly the
same facts. Thus, even while acknowledging that the trial court based its award of a
parking easement based upon the historic configuration of the Easement Area, the Court of

11
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~

Appeals conducted its analysis of a prescriptive parking easement based on the current
configuration of the Easement Area. Id.

11 36, 4 7-51, 53.

Because the Court of Appeals analyzed the parking easement issue based on the
narrower configuration of the Easement Area, it concluded that granting such an easement
in this case would be tantamount to awarding a possessory right more akin to adverse
possession. Id

,r,r 49, 51-53, 55.

With the framework of the relative rights of adverse possession and prescriptive
easements as a backdrop, the Court of Appeals concluded that to grant the Judds a
prescriptive parking easement would amount to a right akin to adverse possession because

ofthe limited land available. The Court at 136 states:
Because the land at issue here is a small area involving a narrow, onecar-wide driveway situated 'in close proximity to each cabin,' we
conclude that granting the Judds a prescriptive right to park in any
-location on the Bowen's property that is on, around, or in the center
of the Driveway impermissibly excludes the Bowens from meaningful
'use and enjoyment' of the Driveway and the surrounding land at all
times that the Judds exercise their right to park on it. 3
The court makes similar statements throughout its opinion. See e.g., id.

,r 47 (stating that

a "right to park on, around, or in the center of a narrow driveway situated on a 'small area,'
which currently 'is wide enough for only one vehicle,' ... intrudes too far into the Bowens'
ownership rights to fit within the limited scope of a prescriptive easement); id.

3

1 48

It should be noted that nowhere in the trial court pleadings, witness testimony, exhibits
presented in trial, findings, orders, or other written subm.ittals is the term "one-lane road"
or "one-car-wide driveway" ever used to describe the Easement Area. Mention of a 'onelane road' first surfaced on appeal of the trial court decision and seems to have been
adopted by the Court of Appeals.

12
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(referring to "the limited available land"); id ,r 49 (stating that a prescriptive parking "right
gives the Judds the ability to wholly exclude the Bowens from that portion of the already

limited land available for the Bowens' own parking" ... (emphasis added)); id

,r 50

(concluding that "a prescriptive parking right in favor of the Judds essentially permits them
to exclude the landowner from the same property'' because "here the property at issue has
very limited space"); id.

,r 51 ("Indeed, in light of the limited land available and the parties'

competing needs, the prescriptive parking easement awarded by the trial court seems to
create a type of time-share interest in the Driveway and the surrounding land that more
closely resembles a shared ownership interest in favor of the Judds."); id

,r 53 ("[I]n the

circumstances here involving limited land inherently subject to the parties' overlapping
and competing needs, the Judds' parking claim is in essence a claim to prevent the Bowens
from exercising the rights inherent in their ownership.").
However, by basing its analysis of the Judds' prescriptive parking easement on the
current, narrower configuration of the Easement Area, the Court of Appeals ignored the
true boundaries and purposes of the easement established over the course of the prescriptive
period. In contrast, the trial court's award of a prescriptive easement for access and parking
and its order to remove the overgrown vegetation, trees, and Bowen's other impediments
was grounded in the historic boundaries and purposes of the easement. The Easement Area

in this case is defined by the historic use starting in the l 930s and running up to at least the
summer of 2008.

Its true boundaries are thus not defined by the current, narrower

configuration and the use and purpose of the easement includes parking.

13
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Once an easement is established according to the boundaries and purposes from
which it arose, the easement holder has the right to the full enjoyment of the easement free
from the interference of the subservient landowner. See Bolton v. Murphy, 127 P. 335,339
(Utah 1912) (stating that if a party has a prescriptive right, ''they have such right without

~

any interference whatever"); North Union Canal Co. v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 180 (Utah
1976) (stating that landowners may "use their property in any manner they please so long
~

as they do not unreasonably restrict or interfere with the proper use of the plaintiff's
easement").

III.

A prescriptive parking easement does not interfere with Bowen's use
when properly defined.

It is fundamental to a correct understanding of this case to correctly define the
parameters of the Easement Area. The trial court defined the Easement Area as it is

~

depicted in the historic aerial photographs introduced into evidence and attached in the
Addendum. These photos start in the 1940s and continue to more recent times. The
current, more restricted area, which restrictions are the result of Bowen's obstructive
actions occurring from and after 2008, apparently confused the analysis of the Court of
Appeals.
To give further understanding to this matter, this Court is directed to Exhibit 2, a
copy of which is provided in the Addendum, which Exhibit was created by John Stahl,
Bowen's own surveyor. The exhibit is an overlay of the Stahl survey over a recent Google
Map photograph of the area in question and gives some comparative size and location of
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(u

the Easement Area. 4 When comparing Exhibit 2 with the historic aerial photographs and
witness testimony on which the trial court relied to define the scope of the Easement Area,
it is clear that historically the Easement Area could accommodate the ingress and egress of
~

vehicles even while other vehicles were parked in the area.

This is particularly true

considering that the Judd Cabin users historically parked in multiple areas of the overall
Easement Area, including both in the middle and around the edges of the Easement Area. 5

4

Exhibit 2 gives some understanding of the historic size and relationship of the Easement
Area to the respective properties. For example, Stahl identifies a 10-foot-wide easement
on the Judd Property. Using that as a measurement guide, the Easement Area appears to
be about 50 feet by 70 feet in size.
5

C. Allen: R. 1918 55:4-25, 56:9-15 (parked and observed others park in most places in
the Circular Driveway including the middle); J. Williams: R. 1918 85:21-25, 86:1-16
(observed others parking all through the area, there were a lot of cars there and they parked
there all the time); R. Judd: R. 1918 90:14-24 ("cars would park around whole circle at
various points"); R. 92: 16-25 ("There were cars all around the circle ... people would park
all around the circle."); 93: 1-4 (cars would typically park along the edges of the Circular
Driveway so that others could get by); P. Johnson: R. 1918 118:2-21 (family and others
parked on the circle); R. 119:2-11 (users regularly parked on the circle from 1935 to 2008);
R. 27:15-19 ("We just parked where we'd always parked."); D. Clark: R. 1918 153:1424 (parked around many areas of the Circular Driveway); R. 154:1-.6 ("only place to park
was ... around the circle."); R. 158:4-25 (verified that Trial Exhibit 13 shows the circle in
1963 with a Judd car parked on the Circular Driveway near the Bowen Cabin); C. Hardy:
R. 191911:10-15 (observed others parking all around); R. 12:7-24 (parked 'Just anywhere"
around circle" and ''Usually it was wide open and we would just come and park."); K.
Harlan: R. 1919 53:3-18 (observed others parking on Circular Driveway and "There
could be up to two cars where I was" [parked] and more cars in other places on circle.
Others would park on left-hand side or the north side of the Circular Driveway. On right
side if there were a lot of cars."); L. Hawkins: R. 1919 36:16-25 (parked everywhere in
the circle); R. 37:1-25, 38:1, 39:21-25 (parked on Circular Driveway every time); L. Jess:
R. 1919 45:2-24 (parked "all the way around the circle". "Lots of cars." "It just depended
on how many cars or people were there."); S. Judd: R. 1919 60:1-25 ("We parked in the
circle." "There wasn't any place else to park but in the circle."); R 61:1-4 (parked "every
time" in the circle from mid-70s until 2008).
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In short, the Easement Area is not a narrow one-lane road but rather includes places
for parking all around and in the middle of the Easement Area. Indeed, surveyor Stahl
even admitted that historically, traffic on the Easement Area has gone both clockwise and
counterclockwise. [R. 1920 211 :9-20.] Thus, there is ample evidence to refute any concept
of a narrow one-way road.

If the physical boundaries of the Easement Area are defined according to the
configuration that existed during the prescriptive period and this Easement Area is
protected, the space is sufficient to accommodate the Judds' use of the same without
denying a reasonable use by Bowen of his property. This comports with the evidence
produced and accepted by the trial court.

It was the mistaken possibility of "exclusion" that apparently concerned the Court
of Appeals and resulted in an adverse possession analysis. See, e.g., 1 49 ("[T]he parking
right sought by the Judds more closely resembles occupation and possession, because it
permits the Judds to physically exclude and prevent the Bowens from using a portion of
their property."). Although the historic use of the Easement Area never adversely affected
the Bowen property, the Court of Appeals appears to be concerned that it may do so going
forward. It is important to note that historically the need for access and parking on the
Easement Area were one and the same. There was no other place to park. Access to the
Easement Area was for the purpose of parking. The Easement Area was a "destination,"
not just for access.
Drawing on this Court's decision in Nyman v. Anchor Development, LLC, the Court
of Appeals emphasized that the rights of the landowner and the rights of a prescriptive
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easement holder must be kept in balance. Judd, 2017 UT App 56,

,r,r 44, 52.

In Nyman,

this court stated that the landowner "should have the use and enjoyment of his property to
the highest degree possible" and "the owner of the easement should likewise have the right
to use and enjoy his easement to the fullest extent possible" and both of these interests need
to "be respected and kept in balance." Nyman v. Anchor Dev., LLC, 2003 UT 27, ,r 18, 73
P.3d 357. The Court of Appeals concluded that, like Nyman, an appropriate balance is not
possible in this case because "the easement holder's rights are on a level near-equal to the
landowner's." Judd, 2017 UT App 56, ,r 52.
But Nyman is inapposite to the case at hand. The plaintiffs in Nyman claimed a
prescriptive easement over some neighboring property on which their garage permanently
rested. This court held that "the right to keep a garage on another's property falls outside
the scope of a prescriptive easement" because balancing the rights of the landowner and
easement holder "becomes impossible where the latter asserts a right to permanent

exclusive occupancy of the fee title owner's land." Nyman,

,r 18 (emphasis added).

The

Court of Appeals concluded that, like Nyman, the Judds sought to exclude Bowen's use of
his property. 6

6

The Court of Appeals also relied on Cohen v. Quarry Estates, LLC, 6 Pa. D & C 5th 388
(Pa. Ct. Com. PL 2006). The plaintiffs in Cohen sought a prescriptive easement for parking
on land that the defendants planned to develop with townhomes. The Cohen court similarly
concluded that the grant of an easement to the plaintiffs would amount to adverse
possession because it would preclude the defendants from developing their property as
planned. Id 397. Both.Nyman and Cohen involve the placement ofbuildings and creating
situations where the rights asserted are mutually exclusive. That is not the case here.
17
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Unlike the permanent occupancy of land by a structure, the right sought in this case
is for temporary parking-~hich does not materially interfere with Bowen's usage of his
property. The Judds' use need not be inconsistent with Bowen's use-especially if the
true, wider Easement Area is recognized and protected. Indeed, the trial court found that
prior to Bowen's "acquisition of the Bowen Cabin property in 2006, owners of the Judd
Cabin and Bowen Cabin properties amicably cooperated in the use of the Circular
~

Driveway for access and parking." [R.1123] The historic photographs also demonstra~e
that it was possible to park vehicles without excluding other users. Thus this is not a case
where it is impossible to balance the competing interests of the parties.
To the extent the easement impedes Bowen's exercise of his property rights, this is
not necessarily inconsistent with prescriptive easements. It is generally recognized that the
rights of an easement holder must be protected from interference, even if this imposes upon
the landowner to some degree. For example, in North Union Canal Co. v. Newell, 550
P.2d 178 (Utah 1976), the canal company had a prescriptive easement along the banks of
its canal for use and maintenance. Id. at 179. The canal was constructed sometime in the
early 1900s and had been in use for more than 75 years. Id Part of the canal passed
through Newell's property and Newell installed a fence along its bank. Id The canal
company brought suit to compel the removal of the fence because it interfered with their
easement. Id at 178.
The Newell court reaffirmed the canal company's easement right stating that the use
"began more than 75 years ago and had ripened into a right before 1950.... Nothing has
occurred to interfere with the right . . . until [Newell] erected the fence" and ''the
18
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continuance of the easement as it has heretofore existed places no greater burden upon the
defendants property than previously existed under the easement." Id. at 180. The court
further stated that because "the fence as presently constructed would interfere with the
[canal company's] use and enjoyment of its easement," the "logical conclusion would seem
to be that the fence should be removed." Id. at 179. But, in an effort to balance the rights
of the parties, the court fashioned its own remedy instead. It decreed that Newell could
keep the fence if he "install[ed] gates at reasonable intervals in the fence along the canal
bank" for the canal company's use. Id. at 180. It concluded that Newell could "use [his]
property in any manner [he] pleased so long as [he did] not unreasonably restrict or
interfere with the proper use of the [canal company's] easement" and remanded the case to
the district court to give Newell a choice: "either remove the fence" or install the gates as
(Jj

the court suggested. Id. It should be noted that at least two justices thought the court went
too far in taking matters into its own hands: "The plaintiff having acquired an easement, it
makes no difference whether the acquisition of the easement was by grant or user, the
plaintiff is entitled to have the easement protected from interference by the defendants or
others. The powers of the court should not be used to protect the defendants' interference
with an established property right." Id. at 181.

Newell underscores the protection of an easement right-even when that protection
may cause some interference with how a landowner might want to use his or her land. The
court ordered that Newell either take the fence down or alter it to accommodate the canal
company; the exercise of his ownership rights could "not unreasonably restrict or interfere
with the proper use of the plaintiff's easement." Id. at 180; see also Bolton v. Murphy, 127
19
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P. 335,339 (Utah 1912) (stating that holders of a prescriptive right "have such right without
any interference whatever"). Keeping in mind the true scope of the Easement Area,
temporary parking would not unreasonably restrict or interfere with Bowen's use of his
property.
Finally, and contrary to Bowen's contention to the Court of Appeals, a prescriptive
parking right is not "outside the scope of a prescriptive easement." Judd, 2017 UT App
56,135. The Court of Appeals declined to address that argument and merely concluded
that a prescriptive parking easement was inappropriate in this case. Id. 136. A prescriptive
easement right is defined by the purpose and bounds of the use during the prescriptive
period. Id.

~

58. There is nothing in Utah case law that indicates a parking right could not

be established by prescription.
This Court has previously addressed a claim for a prescriptive parking right in the
cases of Buckley v. Cox and Lunt v. Kitchens. In both cases, this Court concluded the
claimants failed to meet the elements of a prescriptive easement. See Buckley v. Cox, 24 7
P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1952) (determining that there was no prescriptive easement because
the use was permissive); Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 1953) (same). Notably,
this Court did not decide that a prescriptive parking right was unavailable under Utah law.
Rather, these cases imply that such a right could exist if a plaintiff demonstrates open,
continuous and adverse use for twenty years. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d 305,311 (Utah 1998).
Other jurisdictions have explicitly recognized prescriptive parking easements. The
Illinois case of Brandhorst v. Johnson, 2014 IL App (4th) 130923, 12 N.E.3d 198, is
directly on point. In Brandhorst, a small private road passed in front of the plaintiff's
20
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property and extended to a circular driveway in front of the defendant's property. Id.

,r,r 7-

9. Both parties and their predecessors in interest had historically used the roadway for
access to their properties. Id.
<;j)

,r 9.

The defendants in Brandhorst acquired ownership to the road in 2007, removed the
existing asphalt and replaced it with a "narrower gravel road." Id. ,I 26. The plaintiff filed
suit claiming "he acquired a prescriptive easement over the portion of the roadway south
of his property for purposes of ingress and egress, parking, and general use and enjoyment"
and that the prescriptive period had run before the defendants acquired the property. Id.

,r

28.
The trial court in Brandhorst found that the plaintiff proved the elements of a
prescriptive easement under Illinois law, the elements of which are the same as required in
Utah. The trial court then ordered the defendant to "restore the road to its condition prior
to [the defendants'] modifications" and "prohibited [the] defendants from interfering with
[the] plaintiff's 'historic use' of the easement area, which included 'driving upon, parking

upon, walking upon, and any other uses of said premises as a street.'" Id. ,I 70 (emphasis
added).
The defendants in Brandhorst appealed, and the Illinois appellate court affirmed all
of the trial court's rulings, including the right to park and the restoration of the roadway.

In affirming the order to restore the roadway the court stated: "The use to which an
easement is devoted or for which it is granted determines its character, and to the extent
for which it is necessary to carry out the purpose of the grant, the rights of the owner of the
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easement are paramount. An easement's actual use determines its width."

Id.

,r

95

(citations and internal quotations marks omitted).
The court in Brandhorst noted further that the plaintiff and his predecessors'
historical use of the easement area was much broader than simple ingress and egress to the
driveway. During the prescriptive period, the roadway was used for "parking, walking, and
general recreation." Id.

,r 97.

The new and narrower 15-foot-wide gravel road did not

accommodate those historic uses and the easement therefore dictated the restoration of the
historic configuration. Id.

,r,r 96-97.

Illinois is not alone in finding a prescriptive parking easement7 and this Court should
find that such an easement is also available in Utah.

See Wertz-Black v. Guesa USA, LLC, No. WD 79103, 2017 WL 892562 (Mo. Ct. App.
Mar. 7, 2017), (reh 'g and/or transfer denied (Apr. 27, 2017), transfer denied (Aug. 22,
2017) (affirming a prescriptive easement for access and parking); Giombetti Clue Prop.,
LLC v. DiFronzo, No. 10 :MISC 443972 HMG, 2014 WL 5798286 (Mass. Land Ct. Nov.
7, 2014) (affirming plaintiff's easement for "access and/or parking" but limiting the
parking easement to the area historically used for parking); Lazarus v. Knowles, No. 10
MISC 420255 HMG, 2014 WL 4639457 (Mass. Land Ct. Sept. 18, 2014) (granting
plaintiff's prescriptive easement according to historic use, including pedestrian access and
the right to park one vehicle); Marotta v. Chiulli, No. l\1MXCV106002087S, 2013 WL
6334088 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 2013) (granting a prescriptive parking easement for two
vehicles on the disputed area); Jennings v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., No. 2413 EDA
2012, 2013 WL 11256851 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 17, 2013) (determining owners of
commercial building established prescriptive easement for ingress, egress and parking);
Dettloffv. McCleese-Rosol, No. 287019, 2009 WL 3365751 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2009)
(determining that plaintiffs acquired a prescriptive easement for parking); 140 Main StreetDerby, LLC v. Clark Dev., LLC, No. CV054003433S, 2008 WL 2068250 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Apr. 29, 2008), affd, 116 Conn. App. 188, 975 A.2d 113 (2009) (concluding plaintiffs
acquired prescriptive easement to park on defendant's property); Sciortino v. Kruk, No.
CV075004110S, 2009 WL 415485 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2009) (granting plaintiffs
prescriptiveparkingeasement);Bushv. Ozogar,21 A.D.3d 1407, 801 N.Y.S.2d453 (2005)
(affirming plaintiff's access and parking easement between the parties' houses and
directing defendant to remove a fence that interfered with the easement); Boccanfuso v
1
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IV.

The Court of Appeals erred in concluding trial court exceeded its
discretion in ordering that the Easement Area be restored to its historic
configuration.

Because the Court of Appeals decided that the Judds were not entitled to a
prescriptive parking easement, it also concluded "that the trial court exceeded its discretion
in ordering restoration of the walkway on Bowens' property to a driveway and removal of
any portion of the decorative border or any foliage that does not impede the Judds'
reasonable access over the Driveway." Judd, 2017 UT App 56,167.

Conner, 89 Conn. App. 260, 873 A.2d 208 (2005) (concluding that plaintiffs established a
prescriptive easement for parking and defendants partially extinguished the easement by a
few feet by building a deck and planting shrubbery which stayed in place for the requisite
time to extinguish a portion of the easement); Ngyuen v. Baker, No. 262655, 2004 WL
3021354 (Mass. Land Ct. Dec. 22, 2004) (determining defendants met the requirements· for
a prescriptive access easement and a prescriptive easement for parking); Mazza v. Lania,
No. 259866, 2004 WL 2730792 (Mass. Land Ct. Dec. 1, 2004) (determining that plaintiffs
established a prescriptive easement for parking two vehicles); 520 Success, Inc. v. Success
Village Apartments, Inc., No. CV020391930S, 2004 WL 1888925 (Conn. Super. Ct. July
22, 2004) (determining that plaintiffs established prescriptive easement for ingress, egress,
and parking); Rogers v. Leblanc, No. CVI0342332S, 2003 WL 22080291 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Aug. 18, 2003) (granting a prescriptive parking easement to plaintiff but limiting
parking to one vehicle based on record of historic use); Gorman v. Hess, 301 A.D.2d 683,
754 N.Y.S.2d 393 (2003) (granting prescriptive parking easement and remanding to
determine specific boundaries of the easement); Gorham v. Owens, No. 199846, 1997 WL
33330871, (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1997) (affirming plaintiffs prescriptive easement for
parking on a driveway situated entirely on defendant's property); McLean v. Ryan, 157
A.D.2d 928, 550 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1990) (affirming plaintiff's legal interest in a water system,
awarding defendant a prescriptive parking easement, and ordering defendant to restore
water system to historic configuration); O'Malley v. Guido, 13 Va Cir. 205 (1988)
( determining that plaintiffs established a prescriptive easement for parking and stating that
''the extent of the right so acquired is measured and determined by the extent of the use out
of which it originated"); Brown v. Schneider, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 329, 400 N.E.2d 1322
(1980) (determining that defendant had established prescriptive parking easement beyond
express access easement).
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Although the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court went too far in its
~

orders regarding the maintenance of the Easement Area, it also upheld those orders insofar
as they were necessary to preserve the Judds' use of the easement for "access." The Court
of Appeals' decision regarding the scope of the easement derives from its conclusions
regarding the scope of the Judds' currently reduced easements rights.
Because the Court of Appeals erred in failing to recognize a prescriptive temporary
parking right, its conclusions regarding the restoration orders are also erroneous. As noted
above, the purpose of an easement and its physical boundaries are determined by the
"historic use during the prescriptive period." Judd, 2017 UT App 56, 158 (quoting

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998)). And once an easement is
established, a landowner's exercise of his or her property rights must not interfere with the
easement. North Union Canal Co., 550 P.2d at 180. Indeed, the Court of Appeals
recognized this in stating that ''the Bowens may choose to retain the walkway and park on
the Driveway under their rights of general ownership so long as they do not interfere with
the Judds' ability to use the Driveway to access their property." Judd, 2017 UT App 56,

1 65.

In other words, Bowen can exercise his property rights to the extent he does not

interfere with the easement right the Court of Appeals affirmed.
In this case, however, the historic use of the Easement Area was for access and

parking. Because the Judds have established a prescriptive easement for parking, the trial
court's orders regarding the restoration of the Easement Area (removing recently placed
rocks and trimming back the recent foliage overgrowth) are correct insofar as they are
necessary to protect that right. While a "right cannot be enlarged to place a greater burden
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or servitude on the property," orders requiring Bowen to restore the Easement Area to its
historic configuration to enable the Judds continued use of their easement is not
inappropriate. Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312. The trial court's restoration orders should be
affirmed to the extent they are necessary for the Judds to continue to use the Easement
Area for access and parking.
CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals erred in limiting the prescriptive easement granted by the trial
court to access only and in limiting the Judds' the scope of the Easement Area. The trial
court ruled that the scope and size of the Easement Area is that which is depicted in historic
aerial photos, which is a greater area than the restricted lane created by Bowen post 2008.
The trial court also concluded that the Judds met the elements of a prescriptive easement,
namely that they used the Easement Area in an open, continuous, and adverse way for a
period of over twenty years long before 2008. Finally, the trial court ruled that the historic
use of the Easement Area has been not only for access but also for parking on a temporary
basis. The decision and rulings of the trial court should be affirmed in all respects.

DATED: October 10, 2017.

NELSON CHRISTENSEN
HOLLINGWORTH & WILLIAMS
Bruce J. Nelson
Attorneys for Petitioners
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. JUDD, ill, Trustee in Trust for
the Robert L. Judd Marital Trust, and
CHARLES L. ALLEN, as Trustee of the
Pauline J. Weggeland Family Trust,

.

~

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Civil No. 110917049
Judge Su J. Chon

DAVID R. BOWEN,
Defendant.
A four-day bench trial in the above-referenced matter was held commencing Monday,
August 19, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. and concluded .on August 22, 2013.

Plaintiffs were present and

represented by their counsel, Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. of the law firm of Nelson Christensen
Hollingworth & Williams. Defendant was present during trial and represented by his counsel,
Russell A. Cline, Esq. of the law firm of Crippen & Cline L.C. On the last day of trial, the Court
visited the property.
The Court, being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing, enters the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In the early l 900s, Robert A. Brighton owned a parcel of property near the Brighton ski

area.

4.j
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2. Around the same time, Mr. Brighton separated the property into two parcels, deeding one
parcel to August Winters Grant, predecessor of Plaintiffs and the other parcel to Susa Young
Gates, the predecessor of Defendant.
3. There was no testimony that the circular driveway located on Defendant's property and at issue in

this litigation (the "Circular Driveway'') was in existence at the time the properties were severed and sold
by Mr. Brighton
4. The cabins were built by Mrs. Grant and Mrs. Gates on their respective properties in the
1900s, and those cabins were immediately adjacent to each other.
5. At some point during that time, the Circular Driveway was constructed.
6. Mrs. Gates' cabin was built on the eastern/southeastern side of the Circular Driveway,
with its doorway on the western side of the cabin. There was originally a driveway leading up to
the entrance of the cabin.
7. Mrs. Grant's cabin was built on the northern/northeastern side of the Circular Driveway,
with its main doorway originally on the east side of the cabin. There is a driveway leading up to
the back (southern) wall of the cabin.

~

8. The cabins appeared to have been built to use the Circular Driveway to access the
respective properties.
9. At some point after the cabins and the Circular Driveway were built, Mrs. Grant
conveyed some of her property to the north (known as the "Cannon Property") to Lucy Cannon.
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10. The testimony was that the conveyance included a IO foot right of way along the western
boundary of the Grant property to the Cannon Property (described as the "Cannon Road"). The
Cannon Road was not built by the Cannons until 1995.
11. Plaintiffs, the successors in interest to Mrs. Grant, are the owners of certain real property
and cabin (the "Judd Cabin") l(?cated near the Brighton Ski Resort in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah. The legal description of Plaintiffs' property is:
a Commencing 526.9 feet East and 135 feet South of the Northwest comer of the
East half of the Northwest quarter of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence Easterly 346 feet, more or less, to the center
of Canyon Creek; thence Southerly along the center of said Canyon Creek to the
Northeast comer of the Susa Y. Gates tract a distance of 141.7 feet, more or less; thence
Westerly 346 feet, more or less, to a point due South of Beginning; thence Northerly
141.7 feet, more or less, to the place of beginning.

PIN: 24-35-126-014
12. Defendant, the successor in interest to Mrs. Gates, is the owner of certain real
property and cabin (the "Bowen Cabin") located adjacent to the Judd Cabin, also in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah. The legal description of Defendant's property is:
<a)

a. Commencing 526.9 feet East and 276. 7 feet South of the Northwest comer of the
East half of the Northwest quarter of Section 35 at the Northwest comer of a tract of land
heretofore sold by Robert A. Brighton and his wife to George Romney, Jr., in Silver Lake
Summer Resort, a subdivision of a part of the East half of the Northwest quarter of
Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; :running
thence East 346 feet, more or less, to Canyon Creek; thence South 132 feet; thenbe West
346 feet, more or less, to a point due South of the place of beginning; thence North 132
feet to the place of beginning.
PIN: 24-35-126-015
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13. Both cabins are accessed from the main Brighton road by way of a dirt access road (the
''Dirt Access Road') coming into the west side of the cabin properties. Such Dirt Access Road has

been used for access to the Judd Cabin property, the Cmmon Property and the Bowen Cabin
property for over 100 years and has been used by other cabin owners in that area

14. There is no known written document establishing access to the Judd Cabin, Cannon Property
and the Bowen Cabin properties over such Dirt Access Road, but this is the only way to access
the Judd, Bowen and the other cabins in that area
15. The Dirt Access Road terminates at Defendant's property, at the Circular Driveway has
been in use for many decades. The Circular Driveway is located mostly on the Bowen Cabin
property owned by Defendant.
16. The Circular Driveway is entered from the western edge of Defendant's pro~ and
turns

right to go south, then left going east, then turns left heading north, and then ~ west

returning to the entrance of the property.
17. The Circular Driveway is narrow along the western, southern and eastern sides apd in its
current configuration is wide enough for only one vehicle. The Circular Driveway is also! in close ·
proximity to each cabin.
18. According to the aerial photographs provided by both parties, the Circular l)pveway
appeared to be much larger than its current configuration. There was less vegetation: and the
Circular Driveway was wider in parts, especially on the northern side ofthe Circular Driveway.
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19. Both parties' witnesses testified that cars had parked on or near the Circular Driveway in
the past Witn~ also testified that cars historically parked in the center portion of the Circular
Driveway.
20. Cars are tmable to park in the center portion of the Circular Driveway now.
21. According to the aerial photographs provided by both parties, the Circular Driveway also
extended onto the Judd Cabin property on the northern side of the Circular Driveway.
22. Access to the Judd Cabin driveway is only available from the Circular Driveway.
23. The Bowen Cabin also had a driveway that went up the western side of the cabin, and
two cars could park in that driveway.
24. At some point, the Bowen Cabin users changed the above noted driveway (,r23) to a

walkway with decorative rock outlining the path.
25. Users of the Judd Cabin and the Bowen Cabin have historically accessed their respective
properties by using the Circular Driveway located between the Judd Cabin and the Bowen Cabin.
Such users have entered and exited the properties by using the Circular Driveway.
26. The Plaintiffs provided independent third party evidence of their use of the
Circular Driveway from the l 940s as well as photographic evidence of the use of and
parking on the Circular Driveway throughout the years.
27. Such historic access and parking have been used in an amowit of time well in excess of 20
years. From at least 1935 through 2008, the Circular Driveway was used regularly by owners
and guests of the Judd Cabin property and the Bowen Cabin property.
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28. The Circular Driveway has been open, notorious, visible, and apparent to anyone visiting
the Judd Cabin and the Bowen Cabin.

29. Defendant was aware of the Circular Driveway and use thereof by Judd Cabin
visitors at the time of bis acquisition of the Bowen Cabin property in 2006.
30. As a result of the construction of the Cannon Road, owners and guests of the
Cannon Property no longer need to use, and do not use, the Circular Driveway for access
or parking.
31. There is no legal access to the Judd Cabin property without passing over a portion
of the Bowen Cabin property.
32. Prior to Defendant's acquisition of the Bowen Cabin property in 2006, owners of
the Judd Cabin and Bowen Cabin properties amicably cooperated in the use of the
Circular Driveway for access and parking.
33. Given the small area on which the Circular Driveway was located, the parties
would need to cooperate in a neighborly and amicable fashion which they have done over
the years.
34. Plaintiffs also cut a parking area for about three cars on their property that is
accessed from the northern side of the Circular Driveway.
35. Witnesses established that Mrs. Gates and Mrs. Grant were good friends. There was no
evidence provided that the Circular Driveway was initially a permissive use between the
properties, other than a close relationship between Mrs. Gates and Mrs. Grant.
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36. Prior to Defendant's acquisition of the Bowen Cabin property, no one owning an
~

interest in the Bowen Cabin property objected to the access and parking on the Circular
Driveway by users of the Judd Cabin.
3 7. There is no evidence that at the time of separation of ownership of the Judd Cabin
property and the Bowen Cabin property that the use of the circular driveway was initially
pennissive.

(iJ

3 8. A few years after acquiring ownership of the Bowen Cabin property, Defendant indicated
to Plaintiffs that they were no longer authorized to use the historic Circular Driveway for any
purpose. Defendant indicated that absent a Court Order, Plaintiffs were not allowed to
continue any historic usage of the Circular Driveway for access or parking purposes.
3 9. Thereafter, Defendant installed gates, rocks, landscape lighting, and other barricades

designed to create.an artificial boundary and prohibit further use of the Circular Driveway by
Plaintiffs and users of the Judd Cabin.
40. Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit on August 23, 2011.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Judd Cabin property and Bowen Cabin property were originally the subject of unity
of title, followed by a severance.
2. At the time the properties were severed, there was no evidence that the Circular
Driveway was even constructed, much less open and visible.
3. The second element requiring that the easement be open and visible at the time of
~

severance was not proven. Therefore, there is no easement by necessity.
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4. Owners, guests, and other users of the Judd Cabin property have used the Circular
Driveway regularly and continuously since the early 1900s. Such usage was for vehicular access
and parking.
5. Such use was neither originally nor subsequently "permissive" and is deemed to be

"

adverse.
6. The Circular Driveway is, and has been since at least 1935, open and visible to anyone
visiting either of the two cabins which are the subject to this action.
7. Use of the Circular Driveway for access and parking by visitors to the Judd Cabin has
always been open and notorious.
8. Use of the Circular Driveway by visitors to the Judd Cabin for access and parking has
been under a claim of right.
9. Plaintiffs, their guests, and visitors to the Judd Cabin property have acquired a
prescriptive easement to use the Circular Driveway for reasonable access and parking purposes.
10. Defendant should be ordered to immediately remove any gates, barricades, rocks,
lighting, and recently-grown foliage blocking Plaintiffs' historic access to the Circular Driveway.
11. Defendant should be ordered to take no action that would prohibit users of the Judd
Cabin to continue their historic use of the Circular Driveway for access and parking associated
with use of the Judd Cabin.
12. Plaintiffs should also continue to maintain and use the parking area that they had
cut on their property that is accessed from the northern side of the Circular Driveway.
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13. Both parties cannot block any users from ingress and egress from the two properties, and
should allow appropriate parking that does not interfere with either' s use of the cabins.
Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to prepare the judgment.
DATED this

a)

day of October, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

~
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ROBERT L. ruDD, ill, Trustee in Trust for
the Robert L. Judd Marital Trust, and
CHARLES L. ALLEN, as Trustee of the
Pauline J. Weggeland Family Trust,

FINAL JUDG1\1ENT AND AWARD

Plaintiffs,

OF

vs.

PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT

DAVID R. BOWEN,
Defendant.

Civil No. 110917049
Judge Su J. Chon

In this matter, a four-day bench trial was held commencing Monday, August 19, 2013, and concluding on

August 22, 2013. Plaintiffs were present during trial and represented by their counsel, Bruce J. Nelson, Esq.
of the law firm of Nelson Christensen Hollingworth & Williams. Defendant was present during trial and
represented by his counsel, Russell A. Cline, Esq. of the law firm of Crippen & Cline L.C.
Following the conclusion of the trial, the Court has considered the evidence presented, the testimony of trial
witnesses, and the documents and exhibits admitted as evidence at trial. In addition, on the last day of trial,
the Court visited the properties which are the subject of this action.
The Court, having considered such testimony, exhibits, the credibility of witnesses, and inspected the Judd
Property and Bowen Property (defined below) which are the subject of this action, and having previously
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and incorporates the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law herein, the undersigned now enters the following FINAL ruDGIMENT AND AWARD OF
PRESCRIPTIVE EASE:MENT:

March 19, 2014 05:03 PM
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1. Plaintiffs are the owners of certain real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (the
"Judd Property"), legally described as follows:

Commencing 526.9 feet East and 135 feet South of the Northwest comer of the East half of
the Northwest quarter of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; and running thence Easterly 346 feet, more or less, to the center of Canyon Creek;
thence Southerly along the center of said Canyon Creek to the Northeast comer of the Susa Y.
Gates tract a distance of 141.7 feet, more or less; thence Westerly 346 feet, more or less, to a
point due South ofBeginning; thence Northerly 141.7 feet, more or less, to the place of
beginning.
PIN: 24-35-126-014
2. Defendant is the owner of certain real property also located in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah (the "Bowen Property"), legally described as follows:
Commencing 526.9 feet East and 276.7 feet South of the Northwest comer of the East half of
the Northwest quarter of Section 35 at the Northwest comer of a tract of land heretofore sold
by Robert A. Brighton and his wife to George Romney, Jr., in Silver Lake Summer Resort, a
subdivision of a part of the East half of the Northwest quarter of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; running thence East 346 feet, more or less,
to Canyon Creek; thence South 132 feet; thence West 346 feet, more or less, to a point due
South of the place of beginning; thence North 132 feet to the place of beginning.
PIN: 24-35-126-015
3. The Judd Property is located immediately adjacent to the Bowen Property.
4. Located between the Judd Property and the Bowen Property is a circular driveway
("Circular Driveway'') which has existed for many years and has been historically used by
owners and users of the respective properties for access and parking.
5. Most of the Circular Driveway is located on the Bowen Property.
6. Historic aerial photographs identified the parameters of the Circular Driveway as it had
existed and been used throughout the years. The Circular Driveway was wider in parts,
especially on the northern side of the Circular Driveway.
7. Plaintiffs, their predecessors, guests, and invitees have historically used the Circular
Driveway for ingress, egress, and parking associated with their usage of the Judd Property.
Such usage has continued for more than twenty (20) years, has not been "permissive", and has
been open, notorious, adverse, and under claim of right.
8. Plaintiffs have proven their entitlement to a Prescriptive Easement for use of the Circular
Driveway. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, their guests, and visitors to the Judd Property hold a
Prescriptive Easement to use the Circular Driveway for reasonable access and parking
purposes associated with their usage of the Judd Property.
March 19, 2014 05:03 PM
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9. Defendant is ordered to immediately remove any gates, barricades, rocks, decorative
lighting, and recently-grown foliage blocking or interfering with Plaintiffs' historic access and
use of the Circular Driveway.
10. Defendant is ordered to talce no action that would prohibit users of the Judd Cabin to
continue their historic use of the Circular Driveway for access and parking associated with use
of the Judd Cabin.
11. Plaintiffs are ordered to continue to maintain and use the parking area on the south side
of the Judd Property that is accessed by the north side of the Circular Driveway that Plaintiffs
cut on their property.
12. Both parties are ordered to refrain from blocking any users of the Judd Property and the
Bowen Property from ingress and egress on the Circular Driveway and should allow
appropriate parking thereon that does not interfere with either parties' use of the cabins
located on such properties.
13. The Prescriptive Easement hereby granted is permanent, shall inure to the benefit of
Plaintiffs, their successors and assigns, and shall run with the land of the Judd Property.
14. Defendant's counterclaim for trespass is denied.

15. Plaintiffs' additional claim for an Easement by Necessity over the Bowen Property is
denied.
DATED this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2014.
BY THE COURT:
SuJ. Chon
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Final Judgment and Award of
Prescriptive Easement was served this 6th day of November, 2013, as follows:
ELECTRONICALLY:
RussellA. Cline, Esq.
Crippen & Cline L.C.
~
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10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
J. Thomas Bowen, Esq.
925 Executive Park Drive, Suite B
Murray, UT 84117-3545

Isl Brµce J. Nelson

March 19, 2014 05:03 PM
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FIL~~ D1STF~iCT COURT
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT Tni rd .)i_:r-:·i:::;:-~ ;~istrict
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Ci)

By:

ROBERT L. JUDD, 111, as trustee in trust
for the ROBERT L. JUDD MARITAL
TRUST, and CHARLES L. ALLEN, a
Trustee of the Pauline J. Weggeland
Family Trust,

JAN 1 2 20!5
S;;L; L.;;;E CC!.::ITY

'f-t

Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION
REGARDING TWO MOTIONS TO
ENFORCE JUDGMENT AND MOTION
TO STAY

Plaintiffs,
V.

DAVID R. BOWEN,

Case No. 110917049
Judge Su J. Chon

Defendant.
A hearing was held on November 14, 2014 regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce
March 19, 2014 Judgment and for Contempt, Defendant's Motion to Enforce March 19,
2014 Judgment, and Defendant's Motion to Stay.

Plaintiffs appeared through their

counsel, Bruce Nelson, and Defendant David Bowen appeared in person and was
represented by his counsel, Russell Cline.
Both parties each filed a motion to enforce the judgment. At the time of the filing
of said motions, both parties accused each other of violating the judgment in various
~

ways. Plaintiffs asserted that Defendant was violating the judgment as follows:
1. By failing to remove posts at the head of the circular driveway;
2. The post caused damage to a Judd Cabin user's vehicle;
3. By failing to remove the tree stumps placed at the head of the circular
driveway;
4. By failing to remove the decorative rocks on the Bowen side of the driveway;
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5. By keeping the Bowen side clear to allow access by Judd Cabin users; and
6. By failing to remove the recently grown foliage.
Defendant asserted in his motion that Plaintiffs have failed to refrain blocking users of
the Bowen property from ingress and egress; placing a large rock on the western side of
the circular driveway blocking the use of the Bowen Property; and using the circular
driveway as a pedestrian walkway and hangout. Both parties point at each other as
being problematic.
At the time of hearing, the Court heard that there were only seven issues
remaining. For Plaintiffs, there was the issue of the rock border, the walkway, the post,
the trees and the damage to a guest's car. It appears that the issue of the post is moot
because the post has been removed. Defendant had installed a decorative rock border
on the perimeter of the circular driveway sometime after 2008. Although the decorative
rock border has now been placed several feet back from the edge of the circular
driveway, this border is not historical. In addition, Defendant used the rock border to
create a walkway that is adjacent to the Bowen cabin. Historically, this area was used
as a parking space for the Defendant. Defendant is ordered to remove the decorative
rock border from the circular driveway and to restore the walkway adjacent to the
Bowen Cabin to a parking spot as was used historically prior to 2008, as evidenced
from photographs provided by Plaintiffs at trial.
With respect to the issue of the recently grown foliage and trees, the Court
clarifies its earlier ruling. The Court found that the recently grown foliage and trees
should be removed and based its ruling on the historical aerial photos from the 1950's
to 1970's which showed very little tree growth in the circular driveway. Recently grown
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trees would be ones that have grown from that time period and are now infringing upon
the driveway. However, the Court does not order the immediate removal of the trees
subject to the ruling on the Motion to Stay below.
Plaintiffs also claimed that Defendant should reimburse for the damage done to a
passenger vehicle that was allegedly damaged by the post placed at the head of the
driveway and to mark the Defendant's property line. There is not enough information
G;

before the Court regarding when the incident allegedly occurred, what damage occurred
and whether Defendant bears any fault. Accordingly, the Court declines to award any
damages for this incident.
Defendant claims that Plaintiff placed a large rock in the circular driveway on
Plaintiffs' property. The Court had previously determined that the circular driveway was
partially located on Plaintiffs' property and that the Defendant had use of that portion of
the circular driveway as well. Plaintiffs claim that the large rock was removed. If the
large rock has not been removed, it should be removed as soon as feasible.

1

With

respect to the walking and hanging out on the circular driveway, the Court had ordered
that the circular driveway was for ingress and egress and for parking for the users of
both properties. Nothing in the judgment indicates that Plaintiffs and their users should
be using the Bowen Property for any other manner.
With respect to the claims made by both sides regarding the blocking of access,
both parties appear to bear some fault for not permitting access. However, the Court
does not believe that the affidavits provided by both sides are adequate evidence that

1

Because of the timing of the seasons and the location of the cabins near Brighton, feasibility is
dependent on the current conditions in the area. It is possible that those items may not able to be
removed until the snow has melted.
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one side or the other remains largely at fault. The Court reminds both parties that they
are not to block access for either party or leave them feeling trapped.
Both parties sought to hold the other in contempt. It appears that both parties
have violated the judgment. The Court declines to hold either party in contempt.

~

With respect to the Motion to Stay, the Court denies the Motion to Stay, except
as it pertains to the trees. Defendant requested that the Court allow the changes to stay
in place which includes the post, the chaining of the property, and the decorative rock
border. These changes were not part of the status quo historically and were unilaterally
put in place by the Defendant beginning on or after 2008. The Court orders that the
Defendant removes those items identified in this Memorandum Decision and Order as
soon as feasible. 2 With respect to the trees, the Court is aware that there is an appeal
pending. Because trees are not easily replaced, the Court will not require that the trees
be removed at this time while that appeal is being heard. Defendant is not required to
post a bond for the trees.
This is the order of the Court and no further order is necessary.
DATED this 1ih day of January, 2015.

.

.,

.urt" ~: ~ ·--:\:}'·

~~---

~
2

This requirement is the same as described in footnote 1 above.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed/emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Memorandum Decision, to the following, this

\2

day of January, 2015:

Bruce J. Nelson
Attorney for Plaintiffs
68 S. Main Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
~

Russell A. Cline
Attorney for Defendant
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
rc@cc-law.com

Gj
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West Headnotes (34)

[I)

v.
George R JOHNSON, Cynthia J. Johnson,

To establish title by adverse possession,
the claimant must prove possession of the
property for the entire 20-year statutory
period, and that possession must have been (1)
continuous; (2) hostile or adverse; (3) actual;
(4) open, notorious, and exclusive; and (5)
under claim of title inconsistent with that of
the true owner. S.H.A. 735 ILCS 5/13-101.

and Unknown Owners and Nonrecord
Claimants, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 4-13-0923.

I
June 11, 2014.
Synopsis
Background: Property owner a filed a claim against
neighboring property owners that alleged he had acquired
title to strip of land pursuant to adverse possession
and that he acquired an easement, and he sought an
injunction. The Circuit Court, Adams County, No.
10CH23, Robert K. Adrian, J., granted ownership of
strip of land to property owner, granted a prescriptive
easement, and denied the request for an injunction.
Neighboring property owners appealed.

8 Cases that cite this headnote
(2)

The claimant seeking to prove ownership of
property by adverse possession must also
prove by clear and convincing evidence the
exact location of the boundary line to which
they claim.

[1] the trial court's finding that possession was continuous
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence;

6 Cases that cite this headnote
[3)

WESTLAW

@

Adverse Possession
e- Presumptions and burden of proof
Adverse Possession
► Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
In adverse possession cases, all presumptions
are in favor of the title owner, and the party
claiming title by adverse possession must
prove each element by clear and unequivocal
evidence.

[3] the trial court's fmding that property owner proved his
adverse possession and prescriptive easements claims with
regard to the portion of the property east of the driveway
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; and
[4] the trial court's order requiring neighboring property
owners to restore the easement area to the condition it was
in prior to the 2009 modifications was not an abuse of
discretion.

Adverse Possession
i- Boundaries and extent of possession
Boundaries
6'- Location of corners, lines, and
monuments

Holdings: The _Appellate Court, Steigmann, J., held that:

[2] the trial court's determination that property owner's
possession of tract of land was open, notorious, and
exclusive was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence;

Adverse Possession
~ Character and elements of adverse
possession in general

6 Cases that cite this headnote
[4]

Appeal and Error
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Adverse possession;easements;waters

ti- Necessity

The Appellate Court will not disturb the trial
court's fmdings in an adverse possession case
unless they were against the manifest weight.

The hostility element of adverse possession
does not imply actual ill will, but only the
assertion of ownership incompatible with that
of the true owner and all others.

Cases that cite this headnote
1 Cases that cite this headnote
(5)

Appeal and Error
er Manifest weight

[9)

A judgment is against the manifest weight
of the evidence only when an opposite
conclusion is apparent or when fmdings
appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not
based on the evidence.

Although evidence of the use and control
over land is the typical manner by which
any claimant establishes title by adverse
possession, it must be clearly shown that the
use of the land was adverse and not merely
permissive, since permissive use of land, no
matter how long, can never ripen into an
adverse possessory right.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[6]

Adverse Possession
~ Continuity in general
The trial court's finding that possession was
continuous was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence, in proceeding seeking
to establish ownership of tract ofland through
adverse possession; property owner showed
that he and his predecessors in title used the
portion of neighboring property in the same
way, that the use was not interrupted, and that
the use lasted in excess of 20 years.

[10)

Cases that cite this headnote
[8)

Adverse Possession

Adverse Possession
~ Necessity
Even though property owner thought for a
time that the city, rather than neighboring
property owner, owned a tract of land
adjoining his property, that belief did not
defeat property owner's adverse possession
claim on the basis that property owner's
possession was not hostile; property owner's
belief that his maintenance and control over
the property was consistent with the city's
ownership did not matter because the city was
not the actual owner, what mattered was that
property owner's actions were incompatible
with neighboring property owner's ownership
of the land at issue.

Adverse Possession
~ Necessity
Evidence supported fmding that property
owner's asserted ownership over tract of
neighbors' property was incompatible with
neighboring property owners' ownership,
thereby showing hostile possession in
proceeding seeking to establish ownership
of tract of land through adverse possession;
property owners and their predecessors in title
mowed the grass and weeded the tract ofland,
and their families played games and sports on
the tract of land.

Gw

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Cases that cite this headnote
[7]

~

Adverse Possession
"""' Permissive entry and occupation, and
license

1 Cases that cite this headnote
[11]

Easements
i- Use by permission or agreement
Evidence supported fmding that property
owner's use of roadway was not permissive,
for the purpose of adverse possession claim;
the record contained no evidence that
neighboring property owner granted property
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owner or his predecessors in title written or
oral permission to use roadway.
Cases that cite this headnote

Cases that cite this headnote
[15)

Adverse Possession

(;- Open and visible character of possession
[12)

Adverse Possession
~

The adverse claimant's possession of the
land at issue must be of such open and
visible character as to apprise the world that
the property has been appropriated and is
occupied.

Acts of Ownership in General

Adverse Possession

.- Cultivation
The trial court's fmding that property
owner exercised actual possession of tract
of land was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence, in proceeding seeking to
establish ownership of tract of land through
adverse possession; property owner and his
predecessors in title mowed the lawn, weeded,
raked leaves, and shoveled snow, and their
children played on the land.

3 Cases that cite this headnote
[16)

►

e- Possession exclusive of former owner
Exclusivity, for the purpose of an adverse
possession claim, requires that the claimant
possess the property independent of a like
right in others, and that the opponent, the
alleged rightful owner, must be altogether
deprived of possession.

Adverse Possession
~

Possession exclusive of others

Adverse Possession

Cases that cite this headnote
[13]

Adverse Possession

Acts of Ownership in General

Adverse Possession
Yo-

1 Cases that cite this headnote

Improvements

The making of improvements or acts of
dominion over land, indicating to persons
residing in the immediate neighborhood who
has exclusive management and control of the
land, are sufficient to constitute possession,
for the purpose of a claim of adverse
possession.

[17)

Adverse Possession
i-

Necessity

Using and controlling property as owner is
the ordinary mode of asserting a claim of title
inconsistent with that of the true owner.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

1 Cases that cite this headnote
[18)
[14)

Adverse Possession
Y- Character and elements of adverse

possession in general
The trial court's determination that property
owner's possession of tract of land was open,
notorious, and exclusive was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence; during the
relevant 2~year statutory period, no one but
property owners and their predecessors in
title maintained or regularly used the tract of
land, and they performed yard maintenance,
such as mowing, weeding, and raking, on the
property.

WESTLAW

~1

Adverse Possession
►

Boundaries and extent of possession

The trial court's determination that property
owner met his burden of proving the exact
area of adverse possession was a strip
extending seven and one-half feet south of
the boundary line of owner's property, and
running east to west, was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence, even though
owner amended his complaint to change the
length of the tract of land; property owner's
witnesses testified that they used the entire
yard all the way south to the gutter.
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Cases that cite this headnote
[19)

[20)

Easements
.- Prescription

Cases that cite this headnote
[24)

To establish an easement by prescription,
the claimant must prove that the use of the
land existed for 20 years and was ( 1) hostile
or adverse, (2) exclusive, (3) continuous and
uninterrupted, and (4) under a claim of right
inconsistent with that of the true owner.

The trial court's finding that property owner's
use of easement property was exclusive for a
20-year period was not manifestly erroneous;
property owner and his predecessors in title
believed the roadway was a city street,
entitling them to use it to access property.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

Cases that cite this headnote

Easements
""" Weight and sufficiency

[25)

The party claiming the easement must prove
the elements distinctly and clearly.

Easements
wa- Questions for jury

~

[26)

1 Cases that cite this headnote
Easements
~ Questions for jury

Evidence supported fmd.ing that property
owner's use of roadway was not permissive,
for the purpose of prescriptive easement
claim; there was no evidence that neighboring
property owner granted property owner or his
predecessors in title written or oral permission
to use roadway.

WESTLAW

@

~

1 Cases that cite this headnote

Cases that cite this headnote
Easements
► Use by permission or agreement

Easements
~ Prescription

Gaining ownership of land through adverse
possession means divesting the true owner
of title, whereas gaining an easement by
prescription means merely divesting the true
owner of the right to exclude the claimant
from using the easement property for a certain
limited purpose.

Whether there was adverse use of the way
under a claim of right for a period of20 years,
or the use of the way is only permissive, is
almost wholly a question of fact.

[23)

•

Easements
~ Exclusiveness of use

Cases that cite this headnote

The establishment of a prescriptive easement
is almost always a question of fact.

[22)

~

Exclusive use does not mean that no one may
or does use the way, except the claimant of the
easement; it means no more than that his right
to do so does not depend upon a like right in
others, and it does not mean that the claim is
necessarily well founded.

Cases that cite this headnote
[21)

~

Easements
~ Exclusiveness of use

[27)

~

Easements
► Exclusiveness of use

Adverse possession claimants must prove
that the true owner was altogether deprived
of possession during the 20-year period;
however, because of the lesser interests at
stake, and because it is possible for both the
owner and the claimant to simultaneously
use the same piece of property, prescriptive
easement claimant cases need not prove that
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the true owner was altogether deprived of use
during the 20-year period.
@

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[28)

Cases that cite this headnote

[31)

Easements
0- Continuity of use

The trial court's order requiring neighboring
property owners to restore the easement area
to the condition it was in prior to the 2009
modifications, which removed the 35 foot
wide asphalt road and replaced it with a IS
foot wide gravel drive, was not an abuse of
discretion, in action to establish an easement
on property; the prior roadway was used for
parking, walking, and general recreation, and
the new driveway was not suitable for those
uses.

The trial court's fmding that property owner
established continuous and uninterrupted use
of property was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence, for the purpose of
prescriptive easement claim; property owner
used the easement property on an almost
daily basis throughout the 20-year statutory
period, and neighboring property owners
never attempted to prevent property owner
from using the property.

~

(jJ

Easements
~ Nature and extent of relief in general

Cases that cite this headnote
Cases that cite this headnote
@

[32)
[29)

Evidence supported fmding that property
owner's claim of right to use roadway was
inconsistent with the rights of neighboring
property owners, the true owners of property,
for the purpose of prescriptive easement
claim; property owner and his predecessors in
title claimed a right to use the roadway based
on their belief that it was public property,
and there was no evidence that neighboring
property owner granted property owner or his
predecessors in title written or oral permission
to use roadway.

@

(@

[30)

~

WESTLAW
~

The granting or denying of injunctive relief is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Cases that cite this headnote

[33)

~

Easements
~ Relation between owners of dominant
and servient tenements in general
The use to which an easement is devoted or for
which it is granted determines its character,
and to the extent for which it is necessary to
carry out the purpose of the grant, the rights
of the owner of the easement are paramount.

Easements
fr Weight and sufficiency
The trial court's fmding that property owner
proved his adverse possession and prescriptive
easements claims with regard to the portion
of the property east of the driveway was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence;
property owner testified that he maintained
the lawn east of the driveway all the way south
to the gutter, and that he and his wife drove
onto the driveway every day.

Appeal and Error
► Injunction
Appeal and Error
ii- Refusing injunction

Cases that cite this headnote

~

@

Easements
.,. Adverse Character of Use

Cases that cite this headnote

[34)

Easements
► Extent of way
An easement's actual use determines its width.
Cases that cite this headnote
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'if 5 The following background was gleaned from evidence
Attorneys and Law Firms
*202 Saleem B. Mamdani (argued), Amy C. Lannerd,
Lewis, Longlett & Lannerd, LLC, Quincy, for appellants.

presented at trial. Because the legal issues presented in
this appeal require several distinct inquiries into historical
facts, we review much of the evidence presented at trial in
our analysis section.

Gerald L. Timmerwilke (argued), Blickhan, Timmerwilk:e,
Woodworth & Larson, Quincy, for appellee.

,r 6 A. The Ridgewood Properties
OPINION

'if 7 The rough diagram appearing below, which was

Justice STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion.

prepared by this court and is not to scale, is intended only
to assist in an understanding of the facts. It depicts the
properties at issue as they existed prior to April 2009.

**202 'if 1 In November 2011, plaintiff, Lawerance
Brandhorst, filed a third amended complaint against
defendants, George and Cynthia Johnson, alleging that
he (1) acquired ownership of a strip of defendants'
land pursuant to the doctrine of adverse possession, (2)
acquired a prescriptive easement over portions of a private
roadway owned by defendants, and (3) was entitled
to an injunction enjoining defendants from wrongfully
diverting surface water onto his property.

SJS

,r

2 In September 2013, following a bench trial that
took place over six days between January and May
2013, the trial court entered a written order that (1)
granted plaintiff ownership over the disputed strip of
land, (2) granted plaintiff a prescriptive easement over
portions of the roadway owned by defendants, and (3)
denied plaintiff's request for injunctive relief relating to
defendants' diversion of surface water. As part of the relief
granted, the court ordered defendants to restore a portion
of the roadway to the condition it was in prior to April
2009, when the defendants made significant modifications
to the roadway that affected plaintiff and his property.

,i 3 Defendants appeal, arguing that (1) plaintiff failed
to prove his ownership of the disputed strip of land
by adverse possession **203 *203 (2) plaintiff failed
to prove that he acquired a prescriptive easement over
portions of the roadway, and (3) even if plaintiff did
prove his rights to ownership by adverse possession and
a prescriptive easement, the trial court's remedies went
beyond the scope of the proof. We disagree and affirm.

'if 4 I. BACKGROUND

'if 8 In the 1950s, Arthur Stipp, the father of
defendant Cynthia Johnson, developed a small residential
subdivision along the east side of Ridgewood Drive in
Quincy, Illinois. At issue in this case are two lots in that
subdivision: 821 Ridgewood Drive and 815 Ridgewood
Drive.

'if 9 Defendants own 821 Ridgewood Drive, a narrow,
rectangular strip running 237 feet east to west and
50 feet north to south, which the original plat mat
designated "Future Roadway-Not Dedicated." The
western boundary of 821 Ridgewood Drive lies along
Ridgewood Drive, a city street that runs north and south.
The entire eastern boundary of 821 Ridgewood Drive
borders 825 Ridgewood Drive, a residential lot where
defendants live. The dimensions of 825 Ridgewood Drive
are not relevant to this appeal. A private roadway runs the
length of 821 Ridgewood Drive, connecting Ridgewood
Drive to a circle driveway in front of defendants' residence
on 825 Ridgewood Drive. Plaintiff and defendants-as
well as their predecessors in titl~have always used the
private roadway on 821 Ridgewood Drive for ingress
and egress to their properties. No other structures or
improvements exist on 821 Ridgewood Drive.

{w
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*204 **204 ,I 10 Plaintiff owns 815 Ridgewood Drive,
a rectangular lot that lies immediately north of 821
Ridgewood Drive and immediately east of Ridgewood
Drive. The western boundary of 815 Ridgewood Drive
runs 116 feet along Ridgewood Drive. The southern
boundary of 815 Ridgewood Drive runs 101 feet along
the northern boundary of 821 Ridgewood Drive. The
remaining northern boundary of 821 Ridgewood Drive
-the portion east of plaintiffs property-borders the
back.yards of properties in another subdivision, which are
not at issue in this appeal. At issue in this appeal is the
portion of 821 Ridgewood Drive directly south of 815
Ridgewood Drive.

,r 11 B. The Private Roadway
Over 821 Ridgewood Drive

,r

12 When Stipp first developed the subdivision, he
built the beginnings of a 35-foot-wide, east-west running,
asphalt road on 821 Ridgewood Drive. The asphalt road
was apparently never fully completed, however, and it
extended eastward only about 101 feet, to a point roughly
as far east as the eastern boundary of 815 Ridgewood
Drive. From that point eastward, a much narrower gravel
road provided access from Ridgewood Drive to the
residence at 825 Ridgewood Drive.

way south to the gutter as their own. Each of them thought
that the roadway was city property. Plaintifrs adverse
possession claim concerns the 7.5 feet of 821 Ridgewood
Drive north of the gutter and south of his property line.
Plaintiff's prescriptive easement claim concerns his right
to use the roadway portion of 821 Ridgewood Drive south
of his property.

,r 15 C. Pertinent Ownership History of the Properties
,I 16 1. 815 Ridgewood Drive

,r 17 In July 1986, Joseph and Anneliese Arnoldi deeded
815 Ridgewood Drive to Terry and Gina Miller. In
July 1994, the Millers deeded 815 Ridgewood Drive to
Deborah Holman (then Deborah McCormick). In July
1997, Holman deeded 815 Ridgewood Drive to plaintiff,
who owned and lived at the property thereafter.

,r 18 2. 821 Ridgewood Drive
,r

19 Arthur Stipp and his wife, Doris, owned 821
Ridgewood Drive until May 2007, when Doris, then
Arthur's widow, deeded 821 Ridgewood Drive to
defendants.

,r

13 The asphalt roadway's 35 feet of width
included concrete gutters on both sides, each measuring
approximately 2.5 feet in width. Traveling from east to
west, the gutters ran parallel toward Ridgewood Drive,
eventually fanning out, with the southern gutter curving
south toward Ridgewood Drive and the northern gutter
curving north toward Ridgewood Drive. Because 821
Ridgewood Drive was SO-feet wide, and the asphalt road
was only 35 feet wide, no conspicuous monument marked
where the northern boundary of 821 Ridgewood Drive
met the southern boundary of 815 Ridgewood Drive.
Instead, grass extended from the lawn of 815 Ridgewood
Drive-plaintiff's property-all the way south to the
gutters of the asphalt road on 821 Ridgewood Drive. This
created the appearance that the southern boundary of 815
Ridgewood Drive was at the gutter of the asphalt road.

,r 14 Although the gutter was actually 7.5 feet south of the
boundary line of 815 Ridgewood Drive, plaintiff and his
predecessors in title used and maintained the land all the

,r 20 3. 825 Ridgewood Drive
,r

21 Although 825 Ridgewood Drive is not at issue
in this appeal, we briefly review the ownership history
of that property to provide context for the parties'
present dispute. The Stipps lived at 825 **205 *205
Ridgewood Drive until some time prior to 1979.
(Although the record contains no direct evidence of
when the Stipps moved out of 825 Ridgewood Drive,
plaintiff introduced a 1979 document in which the Stipps
granted Raymond and Lorraine Kibitlewski a perpetual
right-of-way over 821 Ridgewood Drive for ingress and
egress to the Kibitlewskis' property on 825 Ridgewood
Drive. The record is not clear whether someone else
owned 825 Ridgewood Drive between the Stipps and the
Kibitlewskis.)

'if 22 At some point between 1979 and 2006, Bernard
Goggins purchased 825 Ridgewood Drive. In August
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through a sheriff's deed pursuant to a foreclosure sale
after Goggins defaulted on his mortgage payments. (825
Ridgewood Drive was Cynthia's childhood home, where
she lived with her parents, Arthur and Doris Stipp,
until she married defendant George Johnson in 1970.)
Defendants renovated the residence at 825 Ridgewood
for over a year, and moved in sometime around August
2007 or later. Defendants concede that they purchased
both 821 and 825 Ridgewood Drive after the alleged 20year statutory adverse possession period (July 1986 to July
2006) had already elapsed.

2012)) to claim only a 7.5-foot strip of 821 Ridgewood
Drive, which was based on plaintiff's realization that
his original 10-foot measurement included the 2.5-foot
gutter), and (2) he acquired a prescriptive easement over
the portion of the roadway south of his property for
purposes of ingress and egress, parking, and general use
and enjoyment. Plaintiff alleged that the relevant 20year statutory adverse possession period (735 ILCS 5/13101 (West 2010)) ran from July 11, 1986, to July 11,
2006-a period ending before defendants purchased 821
Ridgewood Drive or removed the asphalt roadway.

~

,I 29 F. Trial

,i 23 4. 831 Ridgewood Drive

,I 24 Although 831 Ridgewood Drive is also not at issue in
this appeal, we note that its original occupant, a man by
the name of Zang, codeveloped the subdivision along with
Stipp. Zang and the subsequent owners of 831 Ridgewood
Drive used the roadway on 821 Ridgewood Drive for
ingress and egress during the 20-year statutory period.

,r 30 A bench trial on plaintifl's third amended complaint
took place over six days between January and May 2013.
(Much of the evidence presented concerned the third count
of plaintiff's complaint, which alleged that defendants
**206 *206 tortiously diverted surface water onto
plaintiffs property. The trial court denied that count, and
it is not at issue in this appeal.)

,r 31 As to plaintiff's adverse possession and prescriptive
,r 25 D. Defendants' 2009
Modifications to 821 Ridgewood Drive

,r 26 In April 2009, defendants hired contractors to remove
the asphalt road on 821 Ridgewood Drive, including
the gutters, and replace it with a narrower gravel road,
approximately 15 feet wide, which matched the existing
gravel road providing access to 825 Ridgewood Drive.
Plaintiff was displeased with these modifications for a host
of reasons, including the effect that the modifications had
on (1) flooding in the south-east comer of his property,
(2) gravel runoff onto his property, which exacerbated
the flooding problem, (3) his ability to back out of his
driveway, and (4) the aesthetic qualities of his yard.

,r 27 E. Plaintifrs Complaint
-if 28 In November 2011, plaintiff filed his third amended
complaint, alleging-as relevant to this appeal-that (1)
he acquired through adverse possession a 10-foot strip of
821 Ridgewood Drive immediately south of his property
line (during trial, the trial court granted plaintiffs motion
to amend the pleadings pursuant to section 2--616 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--616(c) (West

WESTLAW

1~•

easement claims, the trial court found that plaintiff proved
(1) his ownership over the northern 7.5-foot strip of 821
Ridgewood Drive by adverse possession, and (2) his right
to a prescriptive easement over the roadway south of
his property. As part of the relief granted on plaintiffs
prescriptive easement claim, the court ordered defendants
to restore the roadway south of plaintiff's property to
the condition it was in prior to April 2009, including
installation of a new gutter and removal of all gravel.

,r 32 This appeal followed.

,I 33 II. ANALYSIS
-if 34 Defendants argue that (1) plaintiff failed to prove
his ownership of the disputed strip of land by adverse
possession, (2) plaintiff failed to prove that he acquired a
prescriptive easement over portions of the roadway, and
(3) even if plaintiff did prove his rights to ownership by
adverse possession and a prescriptive easement, the trial
court's remedies went beyond the scope of the proof. We
address defendants' contentions in turn.
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who bought the property from Miller and lived there until
July 1997; and (3) himself, who bought the property from
,r 35 A. The Trial Court's Adverse Possession Finding
Holman **207 *207 and lived there until well after July
2006, when the adverse possession period ended. Plaintiff
,r 36 I. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
also presented deeds showing the chain of title during the
20-year period. Plaintiff and his predecessors in title each
(11
(2) ,r 37 To establish title by adverse possession,
testified that they used the portions of 821 Ridgewood
the claimant must prove possession of the property for
Drive at issue in substantially the same way. Defendants
the entire 20-year statutory period (735 ILCS 5/13-101
presented no evidence that the witnesses' use or possession
(West 2010)), "and that possession must have been '(1)
of the disputed property was interrupted during the 20continuous; (2) hostile or adverse; (3) actual; (4) open,
year adverse possession period. No one but the owners
notorious, and exclusive; and (5) under claim of title
of 815 Ridgewood Drive, or their families and guests,
inconsistent with that of the true owner.' " Davidson
used or maintained the property at issue. The owners of
v. Perry, 386 Ill.App.3d 821, 824-25, 325 Ill.Dec. 738,
821 Ridgewood Drive never attempted to exclude anyone
898 N.E.2d 785, 788 (2008) (quoting Gacki v. Bartels,
from the property. Accordingly, the trial court's fmding
369 Ill.App.3d 284, 292, 307 Ill.Dec. 501, 859 N.E.2d
that the possession was continuous was not against the
1178, 1186 (2006)). Further, although not one of the five
manifest weight of the evidence.
elements of possession, the claimant must also prove "by
clear and convincing evidence the exact location of the
boundary line to which they claim []."Schwartz v. Piper,
,r 41 3. Hostile Possession
4 Ill.2d 488,494, 122 N.E.2d 535, 539 (1954).
.
"
[7)
(8]
(9] ,r 42 The "hostility" element of adverse
(3)
(41
[5] ~ 38 In adverse ~ossess1on cases, [a]ll possession "does not imply actual ill will, but only the
presumptions are m favor of the title owner, and the
assertion of ownership incompatible with that of the true
party claiming title by adverse possession must prove
owner and all others." Joiner v. Janssen, 85 Ill.2d 74, 81,
each element by clear and unequivocal evidence." Knauf
51 Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d 170, 174 (1981). "Although
v. Ryan, 338 Ill.App.3d 265, 269, 273 Ill.Dec. 2l 4 , 788
evidence of the use and control over land is the typical
N.E.2d 805, 808 (2003). Because the supreme co~ has
manner by which any claimant establishes title by adverse
not explained the meaning_ of "clear and uneq~vo~
possession, it must be clearly shown that the use of
evidence," courts have applied the clear and convmcmg
the land was adverse and not merely permissive, since
burden of proof in adverse possession cases. Dotson v.
permissive use of land, no matter how long, can never
Former Shareholders of Abraham Lincoln Land & Cattle
ripen into an adverse possessory right." Mann v. La Salle
Co., 332 Ill.App.3d 846, 855, 266 Ill.Dec. 57, 773 N.E. 2d
National Bank, 205 Ill.App.3d 304, 309-10, 150 Ill.Dec.
792, 800 (2002). We will not diStnrb the trial court's
230 562 N.E.2d 1033, 1037 (1990).
fmclings unless they were against the manifest weight.
'

Knauf, 338 Ill.App.3d at 269,273 Ill.Dec. 214, 788 N.E.2d

at 808. "A judgment is against the manifest weight of the
evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or
when fmdings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not
based on the evidence." Lawlor v. North American Corp.
of Illinois, 2012 IL 112530, ,r 70,368 Ill.Dec. 1, 983 N.E. 2d
414.

,r 39 2. Continuous Possession
(6) ,r 40 Plaintiff presented testimony from (1) Terry
Miller, who owned and lived at 815 Ridgewood Drive
from July 1986 until July 1994; (2) Deborah Holman,

WESTLAW

,r

43 Miller, Holman, and plaintiff each testified that
during their time living at 815 Ridgewood Drive, they
treated all the land north of the gutter as their own. They
engaged in general yard maintenance, including mowing
the grass and weeding. Theyshoveledsnowfromtheentire
driveway down to the gutter. Their children played games
and sports on the driveway, the roadway, and the grass.
They, their children, and their guests parked their cars on
the roadway and on the grass. Miller parked a trailer and
a "hunting thing" on the roadway or on the grassy area
immediately north of the roadway.

,r

44 Plaintiff's son, Aaron Brandhorst, testified that
when he lived at 815 Ridgewood Drive from 1997 until

20·1 7 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Worl,s.
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approximately 2004, he would (1) camp outside on the
area of 821 Ridgewood Drive north of the gutter, (2) use
an electric edger to edge the grass along the gutter, (3)
mow the lawn down to the gutter, (4) shovel snow off the
driveway down to the gutter, and (5) generally play on the
grassy area of 821 Ridgewood Drive.

,r 45 No

one ever attempted to exclude Miller, Holman,
plaintiff, their children, or their guests from the area of
821 Ridgewood Drive north of the gutter. During the
adverse possession period, Miller, Holman, and plaintiff
all believed that the city owned the asphalt roadway.
Miller and Holman believed that 815 Ridgewood Drive
extended all the way to the gutter. Plaintiff suspected that
the city might own a portion of the grassy area north of
the gutter, but that he was obligated to maintain that area.

[10) ~ 46 Defendants argue that because plaintiff thought
for a time that the city of Quincy owned the roadway and
a portion of the lawn north of the gutter, his possession
was not hostile because it was not inconsistent with that
of the record owner. This argument would be meritorious
only if the city was the record owner. If that were the case,
and plaintiff were required under the municipal code to
maintain the city property, then it would be true that his
possession was not inconsistent **208 *208 with that of
the record owner. However, the Stipps-a private partyowned the land at issue. It is inconsistent with a private
party's ownership of a piece of land for a non-owner to
maintain and assert dominion over the land without any
agreement to do so. Plaintiff's belief that his maintenance
and control over the property was consistent with the city's
ownership does not matter because the city was not the
actual owner. What matters is that plaintifl's actions were
incompatible with Stipp's ownership of the land at issue.

,I 47 The evidence showed that plaintiff's actions
with regard to the 7.5-foot strip-just like those of
his predecessors in title---were equivalent to a claim
of ownership inconsistent with the Stipps' ownership.
Plaintiffs knowledge that he did not own the land did not
defeat the element of hostility. Joiner, 85 Ill.2d at 81, 51
Ill.Dec. 662, 421 N.E.2d at 174 ("To hold that because
the possessor knows or should know that record title is
in another precludes any possibility of the possessor's title
being adverse is the antithesis of the doctrine of adverse
possession as it has existed in this State."). Accordingly,
the trial court could properly conclude that the owners
of 815 Ridgewood Drive asserted ownership over the

WESTLAW
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portions of 821 Ridgewood Drive north of the gutter
incompatible with that of the true owners.

(111 ,r 48 Defendants fwther argue that plaintiff failed to
prove that his use of the land at issue was not permissive
in nature. Specifically, defendants contend that because
Stipp built the residence at 815 Ridgewood Drive with
a driveway attached to the private roadway on 821
Ridgewood Drive, he implicitly granted the residents of
815 Ridgewood Drive permission to use 821 Ridgewood
Drive. Although the evidence suggests that Stipp may
have contemplated the owners of 815 Ridgewood Drive
using the roadway for ingress and egress, the question of
permissive use is not so simple.

,r 49 The original plat map designated the

lot we have
referred to as 821 Ridgewood Drive as "Future Roadway
-Not Dedicated." The original plat map also showed that
lot extending eastward to the end of the subdivision (at
some point in time, the eastern end of 821 Ridgewood
Drive merged with 825 Ridgewood Drive). The unfinished
asphalt road, the designation of "Future Roadway-Not
Dedicated," the opened-ended layout of the roadway, and
the fact that the driveways of 815 and 831 Ridgewood
Drive were built connected to the roadway all indicate
that Stipp originally intended the roadway to be dedicated
as a public street to provide access to the homes in the
subdivision, which may have grown much larger than only
three homes. The evidence suggests that Stipp's original
plans for the subdivision did not come to fruition. This
would explain why 821 Ridgewood Drive exists as a lot
containing nothing more than a private roadway, owned
by people who apparently gain no benefit from its use by
others. The trial court could have reasonably concluded
that the owners of 815 Ridgewood Drive began using the
roadway simply because it was there, and not because
Stipp granted them permission. Indeed, the parties do not
dispute that the record contains no evidence that Stipp
granted the owners of 815 Ridgewood Drive written or
oral permission to use the roadway.

iJ

~

,r 50 Further, the trial court noted in its written order that
Stipp granted the former owners of 825 Ridgewood Drive
-the Kibitlewskis---a perpetual right-of-way for ingress
and egress. Like 815 Ridgewood Drive, 825 Ridgewood
Drive has a driveway attached to the roadway on 821
Ridgewood Drive. The court found that if Stipp intended
to permit the owners of 815 Ridgewood Drive to use 821
Ridgewood **209 *209 Drive for ingress and egress,
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he would have granted them a similar perpetual right-ofway. The fact that Stipp did not shows that plaintiff and
his predecessors' use of 821 Ridgewood Drive was not
pursuant to Stipp's permission. In fact, plaintitrs evidence
showed that Stipp moved out of the subdivision no later
than 1979-7 years before the 20-year adverse possession
period started. Stipp may not have even been aware that
Miller, Holman, or plaintiff was using the roadway.
'i[ 51 We also note that plaintitrs adverse possession claim

concerned the entire area of 821 Ridgewood Drive north
of the gutter, not just the driveway portion. Even if Stipp
had implicitly granted the residents of 815 Ridgewood
Drive permission to use the driveway portion of 821
Ridgewood Drive, that grant of permission would not
extend to the grassy areas to the east and west of the
driveway, which made up most of the 7.5-foot strip.

1 52 Defendants' permissive use argument rests entirely
upon the layout of plaintiffs driveway in relation to the
roadway. This is not enough to warrant reversal of the
trial court's fmding that the use was hostile. The fact
that Stipp did not prevent plaintiff or his predecessors
in title from using the roadway or driveway portions of
821 Ridgewood Drive does not automatically equate to
a grant of permission. IT such were the case, a claimant
could never establish adverse possession because the true
owner's failure to exclude the claimant from the land for
the 20-year period would always lead to the conclusion
that the use was permissive. In this case, the court
reasonably concluded that the owners of 815 Ridgewood
Drive did not have permission to use the roadway or
driveway portions of 821 Ridgewood Drive. That fmding
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

demonstrate that the owners of 815 Ridgewood Drive
"planted their flag" on the 7.5-foot strip. However, given
the characteristics of the land at issue, we fail to see what
more was needed to establish actual possession. The law
is well settled that adverse claimants need not erect a
fence or other structures on the disputed land to prove
actual possession. See Augustus v. Lydig, 353 Ill. 215,
222, 187 N.E. 278, 281 (1933) ("It is not necessary that
land should be [e]nclosed by a fence or that a house
should be erected on it to constitute possession, or that
it should be reduced to cultivation. Such improvements
or acts of dominion over the land as will indicate to
persons residing in the immediate neighborhood who has
the exclusive management and control of the land are
sufficient to constitute possession."). Plaintiff and his
predecessors in title exercised management, maintenance,
and control over the 7 .5-foot strip during the 20-year
adverse possession period. Accordingly, the trial court's
fmding that plaintiff proved actual possession was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.

*210 **210 ,r 55 5. Open,
Notorious, and Exclusive Possession

[141 [15] ,r 56 The adverse claimant's possession of the
land at issue must "be of such open and visible character
as to apprise the world, that the property has been
appropriated, and is occupied." (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Estate of Welliver v. Alberts, 278 lll.App.3d
1028, 1038, 215 Ill.Dec. 580, 663 N.E.2d 1094, 1100
(1996) (quoting Travers v. McElvain, 181 Ill. 382, 387,
55 N.E. 135, 136 (1899)). For much of the same reasons
that plaintiff and his predecessors' possession was hostile
and actual, so too was it open, notorious, and exclusive.
During the relevant 20-year statutory period, no one
but the owners of 815 Ridgewood Drive maintained
,r 53 4. Actual Possession
or regularly used the 7.5-foot strip. Yard maintenance,
(12)
(13) 1 54 "The making of improvements or acts of such as mowing, weeding, and raking, is of such an
openly visible and notorious character that it sufficiently
dominion over land, indicating to persons residing in the
demonstrates to the neighborhood that the person doing
immediate neighborhood who has exclusive management
the maintenance has claimed ownership over the land.
and control of the land, are sufficient to constitute
possession." Ewald v. Horenberger, 37 Ill.App.3d 348,
(16) ,r 57 Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to
351, 345 N.E.2d 524, 527 (1976). In this case, plaintiff
prove exclusive possession because neither he nor his
and his predecessors in title exerted management and
predecessors in title ever excluded anyone from the 7.5control over the 7.5-foot strip just as if they were the
foot strip. While defendants acknowledge that they did
true owners. They mowed the lawn, weeded, raked leaves,
not present evidence that the Stipps or anyone else ever
and shoveled snow, and their children played on the land.
entered the 7.5-foot strip during the statutory period, they
Defendants claim that these actions were not enough to
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[18]

,r 62 Defendants argue that plaintiff's evidence failed

claim that this does not matter because plaintiff carries
the burden of proof. We reject defendants' assertion that
the element of exclusivity required plaintiff to prove that
he excluded people from the 7 .5-foot strip during the
20-year statutory period. Instead, "exclusivity requires
that the claimant possess the property independent of
a like right in others, [and that] the opponent, the
alleged rightful owner, must be altogether deprived of
possession." Malone v. Smith, 355 Ill.App.3d 812,817,291
Ill.Dec. 572, 823 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (2005). Plaintiff was
not required to prove that he ever excluded the Stipps from
the 7.5-foot strip, but only that the Stipps never possessed
the strip during the adverse possession period.

to satisfy the requirement that the party claiming adverse
**211 *211 possession must prove "by clear and
convincing evidence the exact location of the boundary
line to which they claim[ ]. " Schwartz, 4 Ill.2d at 494,
122 N.E.2d at 539. Specifically, defendants contend that
because plaintiff's witnesses delivered their trial testimony
before plaintiff amended his pleadings from claiming a 10foot strip to claiming a 7.5-foot strip, it is possible that the
witnesses described behaviors-such as yard maintenance
and children playing-that took place entirely within the
2.5-foot strip north of the boundary line. This argument
misses the point.

1

,r 63 Plaintiff's witnesses testified that they used the entire

58 Plaintiff's evidence showed that he and his
predecessors in title controlled and maintained the 7.5foot strip during the statutory period as if they were
the true owners. Miller, Holman, and plaintiff testified
that no one else ever maintained the strip, or engaged
in any other actions that would constitute the assertion
of dominion or control over the property. Plaintiff's
evidence sufficiently established that (1) he and his
predecessors in title possessed the property independent of
a like right in others, and (2) the Stipps were altogether
deprived of possession during the 20-year statutory
period. Accordingly, the trial court's fmding that the
possession was open, notorious, and exclusive was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.

,I 59 6. Claim of Title Inconsistent
With That of the True Owner

[17]

,r 60

"Using and controlling property as owner is
the ordinary mode of asserting a claim of title inconsistent
with that of the true owner." Peters v. Greenmount
Cemetery Ass'n, 259 Ill.App.Jd 566, 570, 198 Ill.Dec. 128,
632 N.E.2d 187, 190 (1994). This element is similar to the
elements of actual possession and hostility. Based upon
the evidence already mentioned, we conclude that the
trial court's fmding that plaintiff satisfied this element of
adverse possession was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence.

,I 61 7. Plaintiff Proved the Precise
Boundaries of the Area Claimed

yard all the way south to the gutter. Their testimony in
that regard was not contingent upon whether the actual
boundary line was 10 feet or 7.5 feet north of the gutter.
As defendants acknowledge in their brief, the trial court
granted plaintiff's motion to amend the pleadings because
plaintiff had reached the 10-foot figure by measuring the
distance from the inside edge of the gutter to the boundary
line of 815 Ridgewood Drive. By amending his pleadings,
plaintiff no longer claimed adverse possession over the
width of the gutter, but only over the land north of the
gutter and south of the boundary.

1 64 Plaintitrs amendment to the pleadings substantively
changed the relief he sought, but it had no effect on
the probative value of his witnesses' earlier testimony.
Although the attorneys questioned plaintiff's witnesses
in reference to the "IO-foot strip" lying north of the
gutter, what mattered was not the exact width of the
strip, but instead that the witnesses understood the strip
as part of the lawn north of the gutter. None of the
witnesses displayed exacting certainty as to the dimensions
or measurements of the area at issue. It is inconceivable to
us that the witnesses' testimony would have been different
if they had been questioned about a 7.5-foot strip north
of the gutter instead of a 10-foot strip. After plaintiff
amended his pleadings, his witnesses' testimony was no
less probative because it still showed that plaintiff and his
predecessors in title used and maintained the land all the
way south to the gutter. The trial court found, based upon
the evidence presented, that plaintiff met his burden of
proving that the exact area of adverse possession was a
strip extending 7.5 feet south of the boundary line of 815
Ridgewood Drive and running east to west the length of
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815 Ridgewood Drive. We conclude that this finding was
not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
~

,r 65 Because none of the trial court's fmdings as to the
elements of adverse possession were against the manifest
weight of the evidence, we affirm the court's order
granting plaintiff ownership over the 7.5-foot strip ofland
immediately south of his boundary line.

ordered defendants to restore the road to its condition
prior to those modifications. The court's order granting
the prescriptive easement further prohibited defendants
from interfering with plaintiffs "historic use" of the
easement area, which included "driving upon, parking
upon, walking upon, and any other uses of said premises
as a street."

,r 71 2. Hostile Use
,r 66 B. The Trial Court's Prescriptive Easement Finding

(23) ,r 72 Defendants' argument that plaintiff failed to
prove hostile use of the easement area is substantially
,r 67 1. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
identical to their argument concerning plaintiff's adverse
possession claim. Specifically, defendants contend that
[19]
(20] ,r 68 To establish an easement by prescription,
plaintiff and his predecessors in title used the easement
the claimant must prove that the use of the land existed
area with permission, as demonstrated by the layout of
for 20 years and was (1) hostile or adverse, (2) exclusive,
the driveway and roadway portions of 821 Ridgewood
(3) continuous and uninterrupted, and (4) under a claim
Drive. For the same reasons we affirm the trial court's
of right inconsistent with that of the true owner. Wehde
fmding of hostility regarding the adverse possession claim,
v. Regional Transportation Authority, 231 Ill.App.3d 664,
we also conclude that the court's finding of hostile use was
676, 178 Ill.Dec. 190, 604 N.E.2d 446, 455-56 (1992).
not against the manifest weight of the evidence regarding
The party claiming the easement must prove the elements
plaintiffs prescriptive easement claim.
"distinctly and clearly." Bogner v. Villiger, 343 Ill.App.3d
264,269, 277 Ill.Dec. 593, 796 N.E.2d 679, 685 (2003).

[21)
[22) ,r 69 The establishment of a prescriptive
easement is almost always a **212 *212 question of
fact. Chicago Title Land Trust Co. v. JS IL LLC, 2012 IL
App (1st) 063420, ,r 31, 364 Ill.Dec. 709, 977 N.E.2d 198;
City of Des Plaines v. Rede/la, 365 Ill.App.3d 68, 75-76,
301 Ill.Dec. 722, 847 N.E.2d 732, 738 (2006); Schultz v.
Kant, 148 Ill.App.3d 565,569, 101 lll.Dec. 764,499 N.E.2d
131, 135 (1986). Likewise, "[w]hether there was adverse
use of the way under a claim of right for a period of 20
years, or the use of the way is only permissive, is almost
wholly a question of fact." Petersen v. Corruhia, 21 Ill.2d
525,532,173 N.E.2d499, 502(1961).Accordingly, we will
affirm the trial court's fmding unless it was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. JS II, LLC, 2012 IL App
(1st) 063420, ,r 31, 364 Ill.Dec. 709, 977 N.E.2d 198.

[24)
(25] ,r 74 Exclusive use "does not mean that no
one may or does use the way, except the claimant of the
easement. It means no more than that his right to do so
does not depend upon a like right in others, and it does not
mean that the claim is necessarily well founded." Petersen,
21 111.2d at 531, 173 N.E.2d at 502. Citing the First District
case of Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 2011 IL App (1st) 102389, 352 Ill.Dec. 714, 954
N.E.2d 797, defendants argue that plaintiff was required
to prove that the true owners were altogether deprived of
use of the easement property during the 20-year period.
We disagree with this impossibly high standard, which
runs afoul of supreme court precedent.

,r 70 In this case, the trial court found that plaintiff was

,r 75 Catholic Bishop relied upon two earlier First District

entitled to a prescriptive easement over the portion of
821 Ridgewood Drive spanning 32.5 feet south from the
7.5-foot strip, and running east to west 101.34 feet. This
area corresponded to the entire portion of the old asphalt
road north of its southern gutter. Because the court found
that plaintiff owned a prescriptive easement over this
area prior to defendants' 2009 modifications, the court

cases: Chicago Steel Rule Die & Fabricators Co. v. Malan
Construction Co .. 200 Ill.App.3d 701, 707, 146 Ill.Dec.
378, 558 N.E.2d 341, 345 (1990), and City of Des Plaines,
365 Ill.App.3d at 76, 301 Ill.Dec. 722, 847 N.E.2d at
738. In Chicago Steel-which City of Des Plaines relied
upon-the First District cited the Third District case
of Morris v. Humphrey, 146 Ill.App.3d 612, 616, 100
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Ill.Dec. 144, 496 N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (1986), for the rule
that "exclusivity does require that the rightful owner
be altogether deprived of possession." **213 *213
Chicago Steel, 200 Ill.App.3d at 707, 146 Ill.Dec. 378,
558 N.E.2d at 345. However, Morris was an adverse
possession case. The Morris cowt based its holding on this
court's holding in Hartzler v. Uftring, 114 Ill.App.3d 427,
432, 71 Ill.Dec. 329, 450 N.E.2d 1208, 1212 (1983), and
the supreme court's holding in Towle v. Quante, 246 Ill.
568,576, 92 N.E. 967,970 (1910)-also adverse possession
cases. Hartzler and Towle held that in adverse possession
cases, exclusive possession requires that the true owner
be altogether deprived of possession during the 20-year
statutory period.

ownership through adverse possession (JS IL LLC, 2012
IL App (1st) 063420, 1 43, 364 Ill.Dec. 709, 977 N.E.2d
198), it would make no sense to require a prescriptive
easement claimant to satisfy a much more difficult burden
of proof than an adverse possession claimant. Requiring
proof that the true owner was altogether deprived of use
for the entire 20-year period would do just that.
~

78 As the First District acknowledged in Catholic
Bishop, a majority of jurisdictions have either relaxed
or eliminated the exclusivity requirement for prescriptive
easements. Catholic Bishop, 2011 IL App (1st) 102389, 'if
30, 352 Ill.Dec. 714, 954 N.E.2d 797 (citing Dena Cohen,
Exclusiveness in the Law ofPrescription, 8 Cardozo L.Rev.
611 (1987)). Although exclusivity remains an element of
(26)
[27)
'if 76 Gaining ownership of land through prescriptive easements in Illinois, it does not require the
claimant to prove that the true owner never once used
adverse possession means divesting the true owner of
the land during the 20-year statutory period. Instead, the
title, whereas gaining an easement by prescription means
merely divesting the true owner of the right to exclude the
supreme court's holdings in Schmidt v. Brown, 226 Ill. 590,
claimant from using the easement property for a certain
599, 80 N.E. 1071, 1074 (1907), and its progeny-such as
limited purpose. JS II, LLC, 2012 IL App (1st) 063420, ,I
Leesch v. Krause, 393 Ill. 124, 129, 65 N.E.2d 370, 372
43, 364 Ill.Dec. 709, 977 N.E.2d 198. Adverse possession
(1946), and Petersen, 21 Ill.2d at 531, 173 N.E.2d at 502claimants must prove that the true owner was altogether
remain the controlling standard.
deprived of possession during the 20-yearperiod. Malone,
355 Ill.App.3d at 817, 291 Ill.Dec. 572, 823 N.E.2d at
,r 79 The facts of Schmidt were relatively simple. The Smith
1162. However, because of the lesser interests at stake,
farm sat immediately south of the Brown farm. Schmidt,
and because it is possible for both the owner and the
226 Ill. at 591-92, 80 N.E. at 1071. Brown **214 *214
claimant to simultaneously use the same piece of property,
accessed his home via a private road that cut directly north
prescriptive easement claimant cases need not prove that
and south through the Smith farm. Schmidt, 226 Ill. at
the true owner was altogether deprived of use during the
593, 80 N.E. at 1071. Smith also used that road to access
20-year period.
his home. Schmidt, 226 Ill. at 591, 80 N .E. at 1071. This
situation existed for approximately 40 years. Schmidt, 226
,r 77 In Catholic Bishop, the First District erroneously Ill. at 596, 80 N.E. at 1073. Schmidt, a subsequent owner
conflated the "exclusive use" element of prescriptive
of the Smith farm, attempted to exclude Brown from using
easement claims with "exclusive possession" element of
the private road. Schmidt, 226 Ill. at 594, 80 N.E. at 1072.
adverse possession claims. These elements are much
The supreme court held, as follows:
different. As previously explained, possession requires
"Brown's use of this road was adverse, uninterrupted,
some exercise of dominion or control over a piece of
continuous,
and exclusive, and under a claim of right.
land. See, e.g., Ewald, 37 Ill.App.3d at 351, 345 N.E.2d at
The
fact
that
other persons also used the roadway
527. Use, on the other hand, can be as simple as driving
not
prevent
Brown's [use] from being exclusive.
does
or walking upon a piece of land. See, e.g., Wehde, 237
'Exclusive use' does not mean that no one used the way
111.App.3d at 678-80, 178 Ill.Dec. 190, 604 N.E.2d at 457except
the claimant of the easement. It means no more
58. Proving that no one else possessed a piece ofland over
than
that
his right to do so does not depend on a like
a 20-year period is much easier than proving that no one
in
others.
The use may be exclusive, within the
right
else used a piece of land over a 20-year period. Indeed, it
meaning
of
this
rule,
even though Smith and others also
is difficult to imagine any case in which a claimant could
used the road." (Emphasis added.)
prove the latter by clear and convincing evidence. Because
granting a prescriptive easement constitutes a much lesser
deprivation of the true owner's rights than does granting

Schmidt, 226 Ill. at 599, 80 N.E. at 1074.
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We are unable to square the First District's holding
in Catholic Bishop with the supreme court's holding
in Schmidt. Pursuant to the supreme court's holding
in Schmidt and its progeny, exclusivity in prescriptive
easement cases means "no more" than that the claimant's
right to use the easement property does not depend on a
like right in others. Petersen, 21 Ill.2d at 531, 173 N.E.2d
at 502.

,I 80 In this case, plaintiff sufficiently proved that his
use of the easement property was exclusive. He and his
predecessors in title believed that the roadway was a city
street, entitling them to use it in the manner that they did
during the 20-year statutory period. It does not matter
whether that claim of right was well founded. Petersen,
21 Ill.2d at 531, 173 N.E.2d at 502. Similar to plaintiff's
exclusive possession of the adverse possession property,
plaintiff and his predecessors' use of the easement property
did not depend on the rights of others.

'if

81 Even assuming, arguendo, that the true owner's
use of the roadway would have defeated exclusivity, we
note the evidence showed that the Stipps did not live
in the subdivision during the 20-year statutory period.
The record contains no evidence that the owners of
821 Ridgewood Drive entered that property during the
20-year period. Accordingly, the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that the Stipps did not use the
easement property during that period. The court's fmding
that plaintiff proved his exclusive use of the easement
property was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.

,r 82 4. Continuous and Uninterrupted Use
(28) 'if 83 Defendants' brief to this court does not address
the continuous and uninterrupted element of plaintiff's
prescriptive easement claim. Suffice it to say that plaintiff's
evidence proved that the owners of 815 Ridgewood Drive
used the easement property on an almost daily basis
throughout the 20-year statutory period. The Stipps never
attempted to prevent the owners of 815 Ridgewood Drive
from using the easement property. We conclude that the
trial court's finding in favor of plaintiff as to this element
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

WESTLAW
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'if 84 5. Claim of Right Inconsistent
With That of the True Owner
[29) 'if 85 For the same reasons that plaintiff and his
predecessors' use of the easement p~operty was hostile
and exclusive, their claim of right to use the easement
property was also inconsistent with the rights of the true
owner. Plaintiff and **215 *215 his predecessors in
title claimed a right to use the roadway based upon
their understanding that it was public property. As with
plaintiff's adverse possession claim, it does not matter
whether this claim of right was well founded, so long as it
existed for the entire 20-year statutory period. Using the
private roadway as if it were public property constitutes
use under a claim of right inconsistent with that of the true
owner. Based upon the evidence presented, the trial court's
fmding as to this element was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.

,r 86

Because none of the trial court's fmdings as to the
elements of plaintiff's prescriptive easement claim were
against the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm the
court's order granting plaintiff a prescriptive easement.

,r 87 C. The Scope of the Trial Court's Remedies
,r

88 Defendants argue that even if plaintiff proved
his rights to ownership by adverse possession and a
prescriptive easement, the trial court's remedies went
beyond the scope of the proof. Specifically, defendants
contend that (1) the court's relief, which granted plaintiff
ownership and an easement over the portions of 821
Ridgewood Drive east of the driveway, was against
the manifest weight of the evidence, and (2) the court
improperly ordered defendants to restore the roadway
to the condition it was in prior to the April 2009
modifications. We disagree.

,r 89 1. The Area East of the Driveway
,r 90

Defendants contend that plaintiff failed to
prove his adverse possession and prescriptive easements
claims with regard to the portion of 821 Ridgewood Drive
east of the driveway. Specifically, they assert that Miller's
testimony failed to establish his continuous assertion of
[30)
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ownership and use of that area while he was living at 815
Ridgewood Drive.

,r 91 Miller testified that he maintained the lawn east of
the driveway all the way south to the gutter. For a period
of time, he parked a trailer and a "hunting thing" in
the grassy area just north of the gutter and east of the
driveway, or on the roadway itself east of the driveway.
Miller's children would play and ride bikes in the roadway.
Miller testified that he and his wife drove over the roadway
and into the driveway every day. When Miller backed out
of his driveway, he "would back out and square [him]self
probably about where the gravel road was an then head
toward Ridgewood." Miller's testimony established that
his assertion of ownership and use of the portions of 821
Ridgewood Drive east of his driveway was continuous and
uninterrupted. We conclude that the trial court's fmdings
regarding the portion of 821 Ridgewood Drive east of
the driveway were not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.

,r 92 2. Restoration of the Roadway
(31] ,r 93 Defendants argue that, assuming the trial court
properly granted plaintiff an easement over the area of
821 Ridgewood Drive where the asphalt roadway used
to be, the court's mandatory injunctive relief requiring
defendants to restore the roadway was improper because
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendants' 2009
removal of the asphalt roadway interfered with his use
of the easement. In their brief, defendants characterize
the 2009 modifications to the roadway as "cosmetic,"
and insufficient to threaten plaintiffs historical use of
the easement area, which the court found to include
"driving upon, parking upon, walking upon, and any
other common uses of said premises as a street."

and to the extent for which it is necessary to carry out
the purpose of the grant, the rights of the owner of
the easement are paramount." (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Sc/muck Markets, Inc. v. Soffer, 213 Ill.App.3d
957, 974, 157 Ill.Dec. 705, 572 N.E.2d 1169, 1182 (1991)
(quoting Farmers Grain & Supply Co. of Warsaw v. Toledo,
Peoria & Western RR, 316 Ill.App. 116, 123, 44 N.E.2d
77, 80 (1942)). "An easement's actual use determines its
width." JS II. LLC, 2012 IL App (1st) 063420, ,r 44, 364
Ill.Dec. 709, 977 N.E.2d 198.

,r 96 In this case, the trial court determined that plaintiff
was entitled to an easement over the portions of 821
Ridgewood Drive once covered by the asphalt road.
The easement encompassed the "common uses of said
premise as a street." (Emphasis added.) The court, after
presiding over a 6--day bench trial at which it heard
lengthy testimony from witnesses on both sides and
accepted dozens of exhibits into evidence, found that
defendants unreasonably interfered with plaintiffs use of
the easement by removing the 35-foot-wide asphalt road
and replacing it with a 15-foot-wide gravel drive. Based
upon the evidence and arguments, the court found that
equity required defendants to restore the easement area to
the condition it was in prior to the 2009 modifications. We
disagree that this ruling constituted an abuse of discretion.

,r 97

Defendants' removal of the asphalt roadway was
clearly more than a cosmetic change. Although it was
still physically possible for an ordinary vehicle to get in
and out of the driveway, plaintiff and his predecessors'
historical use of the easement area was much broader
than simple ingress and egress to the driveway. They used
the roadway for parking, walking, and general recreation.
The new 15-foot-wide gravel road was not suitable for
those uses. Even with regard to ingress and egress, plaintiff
testified that he was no longer able to back his boat trailer
out of his driveway following the 2009 modifications,
(32] ,r 94 The granting or denying of injunctive relief is particularly because defendants oddly chose to place their
mailbox along the north side of the new gravel road several
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Seymour v. Harris
feet directly east of plaintiff's driveway. See Schaefer v.
Trust & **216 *216 Savings Bank of Chicago, 264
Burnstine, 13 Ill.2d 464, 469, 150 N.E.2d 113, 116 (1958)
Ill.App.3d 583, 595, 201 Ill.Dec. 553, 636 N.E.2d 985,
("The
rule obtaining in this State is that the owner of a
993 (1994). An abuse of discretion exists only when no
right
of
way for ingress and egress has the right to use the
reasonable person would have adopted the trial court's
full width of the area or strip having definite boundaries,
view. Fennell v. Illinois Central RR. Co., 2012 IL 113812,
unhampered by obstructions placed thereon."). Based
,r 21, 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355.
upon the evidence presented, the court's determination of
the
appropriate scope of injunctive relief was well within
[33)
[34] ,r 95 "[T]he use to which an easement is
its discretion.
devoted or for which it is granted determines its character,
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,r 98 As a fmal matter, we express our gratitude to the trial
court for stating its fmdings and reasoning in a written
order, which we found very useful in our consideration of
this appeal.

,r 99 ID. CONCLUSION
,r 100 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's

iI 101 Affumed.

Justices POPE and HOLDER WHITE concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
All Citations
2014 IL App (4th) 130923, 12 N.E.3d 198, 382 ID.Dec. 198

judgment.
End of Document
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RO1H, Judge:

cr[l
David Bowen appeals from a judgment granting a
prescriptive easement to Robert L. Judd III and Charles L. Allen
to use and park on his driveway. We affirm in part and reverse
in part and remand the case for further proceedings.
1. Justice John A. Pearce began his work on this case as a
member of the Utah Court of Appeals. He became a member of
the Utah Supreme Court thereafter and completed his work on
the case sitting by special assignment as authorized by law. See
generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 3-108(3).
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Judd v. Bowen

BACKGROUND
<JI2
This appeal centers on a century-old circular driveway
(the Driveway) between two cabins in Big Cottonwood Canyon.
The cabin on the southeast of the Driveway belongs to the
Bowens,2 and the Driveway is located almost entirely on their
property. The cabin to the northeast of the Driveway belongs to
the Judds, who claim a legal right stemming from historic usage
. to access their property over the Driveway and to park within its
bounds.
<JI3
A dirt road diverging from the top of Big Cottonwood
Canyon Scenic Byway provides access to both properties. In the
early 1900s, the predecessors of the two parties built cabins next
to each other. At some point during that time, the Driveway was
also constructed. The dirt access road terminates at the Driveway.
The Driveway is circular, one lane, and narrow, bounded along
its outer and inner borders by foliage, shrubbery, boulders, and
sloping ground. With the exception of a sliver of its northern
portion, the Driveway is located on the Bowens' property. While
the Driveway is currently not the only access or parking
available for Judd cabin users, over the years it has been their
primary access for ingress, egress, and parking purposes. The
Driveway also currently provides the Judds' only access to a
private driveway in front of their cabin. For the Bowens and
their predecessors, the Driveway has served as the only access to
their cabin for the owners and their guests.
<JI4
The cabins' original builders had been close friends, and
until 2008, the Judds and Bowens had coexisted peaceably. For
many years, descendants of the original owners of both cabins
shared use of their respective cabins among their family
2. Although the parties are individuals, they refer to their
interests in the property at issue as historically aligned with the
Bowen family or the Judd family. Accordingly, we refer to the
parties here as the Judds and the Bowens for convenience.
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members, with no single family group or member assigned more
than a few weeks of dedicated time at either cabin per year. In
addition, both groups used their respective cabins during
holidays and other special occasions for parties and family
gatherings. The Bowens maintain that it was always understood
that the Driveway was the Bowens' property, and that the Judds'
use was permitted only out of neighborly accommodation, while
the Judds maintain that they had "always" used the Driveway as
a sort of given; it was their "custom" and "just what [they'd]
done." Until relatively recently, the users of the two cabins
rarely encountered each other on the Driveway, and the
respective groups only occasionally hampered each other's
ability to access or enjoy the use of it. On the rare occasions
when a Bowen user was already parked on the Driveway when a
Judd user arrived, the Judd user would "work around" that
impediment and find other access and parking. On the occasions
when a Judd user was parked on the Driveway or otherwise
blocking a Bowen user's access and parking, the Bowens would
request that the Judd user move the vehicle, and the request was
always accommodated.
ci[S
In 2006, David Bowen bought out his siblings' interests
and became the sole owner of the Bowen cabin. As a result, his
use of the Bowen cabin increased while the Judds continued to
use their cabin under the customary assigned-time arrangement.
In 2008, an incident occurred where a Judd user, for the first
time, refused to move a vehicle off the Driveway at the Bowens'
request. A week later, one of the trustees who shared an interest
in the Judds' cabin informed the Bowens that the Judds were
asserting a prescriptive right to use and park on ~e Driveway,
and that if the Judds were not able to park on the Driveway,
neither could the Bowens. Subsequently, the Bowens erected
gates that blocked the Judds from using the portion of the
Driveway closest to the Bowens' cabin while allowing the Judds
access to the side of the Driveway closest to the Judds' property.
The relationship continued to deteriorate, however, as accessblocking incidents increased. The Bowens eventually told the
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Judds that they would no longer be allowed to use the Driveway
"absent a court order."
<J[6
The Judds filed suit in 2011 to establish a prescriptive
right to use the Driveway for ingress, egress, and parking
purposes. Following a four-day trial, the trial court found that
the Judd usage had been "open, notorious," "under claim of
right," and "adverse" for the twenty-year prescriptive period.
The court accordingly awarded the Judds a prescriptive
easement for "reasonable access and parking purposes
associated with" the Judds' cabin usage. It also ordered the
Bowens to "immediately remove any gates, barricades, rocks,
decorative lighting, and recently-grown foliage blocking or
interfering with [the Judds'] historic access and use" of the
Driveway. The court ordered both parties to "refrain from
blocking any users" of either property and to "allow appropriate
parking thereon that does not interfere with either parties' use of
the cabins located on such properties."
<J[7
The court's judgment did not bring peace, however; both
parties filed motions to enforce the judgment and hold the other
in contempt based on various alleged violations of the court's
order. The trial court clarified its final judgment in a January
2015 memorandum decision. In that decision, among other
things, the trial court ordered the Bowens to remove a decorative
rock border they had installed "sometime after 2008" because it
was "not historical," to "restore the walkway adjacent to the
Bowen Cabin to a parking spot as was used historically prior to
2008," and to remove "recently grown foliage and trees," which
it defined as growth that had occurred following the 1950s to
1970s and is "now infringing upon the driveway." 3 The Bowens
appeal.

~

~

3. The court stated that it ''based its ruling [regarding the foliage
removal] on the historical aerial photos from the 1950s to 1970s
which showed very little tree growth in" the Driveway.
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ISSUES

<J:[8
The Bowens argue that the trial court erred when it
granted a prescriptive easement to the Judds. The Bowens also
argue, in the alternative, that the trial court abused its discretion
in determining the easement's scope by granting parking rights
as part of the easement and "failing to set the boundaries of the
easement with reasonable certainty."

ANALYSIS

Cj

<J:[9
Prescriptive easements have a long history in the common
law. Initially, they were based upon the rationale that a long and
particular use of land by a person other than the landowner was
evidence of a lost grant in favor of that user. See Richins v. Struhs,
412 P.2d 314, 315-316 (Utah 1966); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch
Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 151 (Utah 1946). Legal recognition of a
prescriptive right was said to restore and maintain that lost
grant, and the extent of the right was determined by the type of
use made of the land during the prescriptive period. Big
Cottonwood, 174 P.2d at 151-52. While the legal fiction behind
prescriptive easements is now seldom invoked, it continues to
provide justification for conferring prescriptive rights-namely,
that "peace" and the "good order of society'' is assured by
"leaving a long established status quo at rest rather than by
disturbing it." Richins, 412 P.2d at 315. In other words, if a nonowner has long made use of land in a particular manner without
objection from the land's owner, to prevent "dispute[s] after
several decades of amicable use," the law recognizes a
prescriptive right for the non-owner to continue making use of
the land in the same way. See Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 628
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]he doctrine of prescriptive easement
was designed to give legal sanction to property arrangements
that have existed peacefully, openly, continuously and without
objection for the prescriptive period.").

Ci
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':[10 To attain legal recognition of a prescriptive easement in
Utah, the claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the claimant's "use of another's land was open, continuous,
and adverse under a claim of right for a period of twenty years."
Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 1998) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT
App 192, 'Il 18, 186 P.3d 978 ("Each of [the prescriptive easement
elements] must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.").
However, "once a claimant has shown an open and continuous
use of the land under claim of right for the twenty-year
prescriptive period, the use will be presumed to have been
adverse." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998)
(plurality opinion). At that point, the landowner, "to prevent the
prescriptive easement from arising[,] has the burden of showing
that the use was under him instead of against him." Zollinger v.
Frank, 175 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1946). Stated differently, once the
presumption of adverse use arises, "the owner of the servient
estate then has the burden of establishing that the use was
initially permissive" or that the adverse use, at some point
during the prescriptive period, became permissive, to prevent
the prescriptive right from being established. Valcarce, 961 P.2d
at 311-12. "In order for the use to have been permissive it would
have to appear that the parties understood that the driveway
was upon the [landowner's] property; that it was with this
understanding that [the landowner] gave their consent to its use;
and similarly that the [claimants] so understood and accepted
and used it." Richins, 412 P.2d at 316.
':[11 The Bowens challenge the trial court's conclusions
regarding every required element of a prescriptive easement,
other than the twenty-year time requirement. They argue that
the trial court failed to "employ the correct legal standard" when
it determined that the Judds acquired a prescriptive right "to use
and park on" the Driveway. In particular, they argue that the
trial court failed to apply "the critical limitations built into the
common law elements of a prescriptive easement claim." As
proof, they point to allegedly undisputed evidence, asserting
~
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that it precluded the Judds from clearly and convincingly
establishing several prescriptive easement elements.

~

112 "[W]hether the trial cowt applied the proper legal
standard is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness."
Jacob v. Bate, 2015 UT App 206, 113, 358 P.3d 346 (alteration in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While
the conclusion that a prescriptive easement has been acquired is
a question of law, because that determination is fact-intensive,
we afford the trial court a "broad measure" of discretion in its
application of the correct legal standard to a particular set of
facts and will overturn the determination only if the trial court
exceeded its discretion. Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 311 (stating that the
finding of an easement is "the type of highly fact-dependent
question, with numerous potential· fact patterns, which accords
the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when applying the
correct legal standard to the given set of facts"); see also Lance,
2008 UT App 192, 19.
113 We first address the trial court's easement determination,
affirming the court's conclusion that the Judds have acquired a
prescriptive easement to use· the Driveway for reasonable access
purposes but reversing the court's parking easement
determination. We then address the scope of the trial court's
orders in light of our conclusions.
I. Existence of the Prescriptive Easement
A.

Access

114 The trial court concluded that the Judds had used the
Driveway for access continuously, as well as openly and
notoriously, since the early 1900s. It concluded that the Judds'
use was adverse and that the use was "neither originally nor
subsequently permissive." The Bowens do not dispute the trial
court's factual findings but instead contend that the court's
conclusions failed to incorporate critical limitations of the
prescriptive easement elements and that, as a result, those
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conclusions are incorrect as a matter of law. Accordingly, "we
accept the trial court's factual findings as true and analyze its
legal conclusions based on those findings." Uhrhahn Constr. &
Design, Inc. v. Hopkins, 2008 UT App 41, n.2, 179 P.3d 808. "We
review the legal sufficiency of the factual findings-that is,
whether the trial court's factual findings are sufficient to support
its legal conclusions-under a correction-of-error standard,
according no particular deference to the trial court." Brown v.
Babbitt, 2015 UT App 161, <:[ 5, 353 P.3d 1262 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
<:[15 We conclude that the trial court's factual findings support
its legal conclusions that the Judds had established a prescriptive
right to use the Driveway for access purposes. In particular, the
trial court's findings permit the legal conclusion that the Judds
had established that their use of the Driveway for access
purposes was continuous and open and notorious and that the
presumption of adversity applied. The trial court's factual
findings also support the conclusion that the Bowens have not
rebutted the adversity presumption. We address each
prescriptive easement element below.
1.

Continuous

<:[16 The continuity required to establish a prescriptive
easement does not entail frequent or constant use. Crane v. Crane,
683 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 1984). Rather, "[a]ll that is necessary is
that the use be as often as required by the nature of the use and
the needs of the claimant." Id.; Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559
P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977). Thus, the frequency of use is not
critical, and continuity can be established if the claimant can
show that he made use of the landowner's property whenever
desired or required under the circumstances. See Richards, 559
P.2d at 949; see also Crane, 683 P.2d at 1064 (concluding that use
was continuous where a cattle grazing association drove cattle
over a portion of the landowner's property twice a year-once in
the fall, and once in the spring, i.e., whenever the claimant
needed to do so). The use also "must appear not to have been
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interrupted by the owner of the land across which the right is
exercised[.]" Richards, 559 P.2d at 949 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).

~

«J[17 With regard to continuity, the trial court found that, "[t]he
cabins appeared to have been built to use the Circular Driveway
to access the respective properties"; that "(a]ccess to the Judd
Cabin driveway is only available from the Circular Driveway"
and "there is no legal access to the Judd Cabin property without
passing over a portion of the Bowen Cabin property"; that
"users of the Judd Cabin and Bowen Cabin have historically
accessed their respective properties by using the Circular
Driveway located between the [cabins]" and that "[s ]uch users
have entered and exited the properties by using the Circular
Driveway"; that before David Bowen acquired "the Bowen
Cabin property, no one owning an interest in the Bowen Cabin
property objected to the access ... on the Circular Driveway by
users of the Judd Cabin"; and that "[f]rom at least 1935 to 2008,
the Circular Driveway was used regularly by owners and guests
of the Judd Cabin property and the Bowen Cabin property."
<JI18 These findings adequately support the trial court's
conclusion that the Judds' use of the Driveway for access
purposes was continuous. They demonstrate that the trial court
considered, as required, the "nature of the [Judds'] use" (driving
over a narrow one-lane circular driveway to access a cabin
property in a forested, mountainous location) in relation to the
Judds' need to do so. See Crane, 683 P.2d at 1064. They also
support a legal conclusion that the Judds had continuously used
the Driveway to access their cabin for over seventy years,
whenever they desired to access their cabin. See Richards, 559
P.2d at 949 (" All that is required is that the use be as often as is
required by the owner of the dominant estate."). Further, the
trial court made no findings suggesting that the Judds' regular
and continuous use of the Driveway for access had been, as a
legal matter, broken or interrupted by the Bowens or their
predecessors between 1935 and 2008. See id. (noting that a
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claimant's use "must appear not to have been interrupted by the
owner of the land across which the right is exercised").
<j[19 To be sure, as the Bowens point out, there was some
testimony at trial that not every Judd user was able to use the
Driveway for access purposes in every single instance when he
or she desired to do so and that the Judds' use was, at times,
interrupted by Bowen cabin users. For example, several Judd
witnesses estimated that they were able to use the Driveway for
access purposes ninety-five percent of the time they attempted to
do so, which the Bowens assert demonstrates that the Judds
could not use the Driveway for access in every instance they
desired. And the Bowens also argue that the continuity
requirement was not met because the Bowens, at least in recent
years, "repeatedly interrupted the Judds' use of the [Driveway]"
by asking Judd users to move their parked vehicles so that the
Bowens could use and park on the Driveway. The Bowens
contend that such evidence required the trial court to conclude
that the Judds' use was not continuous as a matter of law.
<j[20 But the Judds sought two distinct easement rights-the
right to use the Driveway for access and the right to use the
Driveway for parking. Evidence that the Bowens asked the
Judds to move vehicles parked on the Driveway is, at best,
evidence of interruption of the Judds' asserted parking right, not
their access right; the fact that the Bowens, on rare occasions,
asked the Judds to move parked vehicles and that the Judds
accommodated does not demonstrate that the Bowens also
interrupted the Judds' right to simply pass over the Driveway.
As a result, we do not consider evidence of interruption of the
Judds' parking as evidence that the trial court was incorrect in its
continuity determination as to the Judds' use of the Driveway
for access purposes.
<j[21 And as to the access, while there was testimony from
some Judd witnesses that, on rare occasions, they could not use
the Driveway for access, there was also testimony from several
other Judd users that suggested the Driveway was used for
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access whenever it was needed or required, without limitation.
To the extent this evidence presented a choice of conflicting
evidence, we defer to the trial court's judgment in resolving that
conflict. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(4) ("Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard
to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."); see also Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, 119, 186
P.3d 978 ("[W]e may not substitute our judgment for that of the
trial court as trial courts are in a better position to weigh
conflicting evidence and evaluate the credibility of witness
testimony."). And in any event, the Bowens have not challenged
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's factual
findings or demonstrated that the findings which seem to
support the legal conclusion that the Judds' use was continuous
were clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court's factual findings support its legal conclusion that the
Judds' use was continuous.
2.

Open and Notorious

,r22 The open and notorious element requires a claimant to
prove that her use of another's property was "with knowledge of
the landowner." Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah 1953).
However, proof of actual notice or knowledge is not required.
Jensen v. Gerrard, 39 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Utah 1935). Rather,
knowledge may be imputed if the use is "notorious" enough that
the landowner could learn of it through "reasonable diligence."

"'

Id.

<f[23 As with the continuity element, the trial court made
several findings relevant to its conclusion that the Judds' use of
the Driveway for access purposes was open and notorious. It
found that "[t]he Circular Driveway has been open, notorious,
visible, and apparent to anyone visiting the Judd Cabin and the
Bowen Cabin"; "[David Bowen] was aware of the Circular
Driveway and use thereof by Judd Cabin visitors" when he
acquired the property in 2006; the Judds could not legally access
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their cabin property without passing over some portion of the
Bowens' property; the "owners of the [two cabins] amicably
cooperated in the use of the Circular Driveway for access and
parking;" and "[g]iven the small area on which the Circular
Driveway was located, the parties would need to cooperate in a
neighborly and amicable fashion." The court also found that the
cabins appeared to have been built to use the Circular
Driveway to access the respective properties" and that "[t]he
Circular Driveway is also in close proximity to each cabin."
11

«Jl24 These factual findings demonstrate that the trial. court
properly considered whether the Judds' use was knownwhether actually or constructively-to the Bowens and their
predecessors and thus support the trial court's legal conclusion
that the Judds' use was open and notorious. See id. Even though
the cabins were located in a relatively secluded area, the close
proximity of the two cabins, the obvious presence of the
Driveway and its placement, the history of cooperation, and the
Judds' limited legal access to their property support the court's
conclusion that the Bowens and their predecessors were aware
of (or should have been aware of) the Judds' use and that the
Judds' use was therefore open and notorious.
3.

Adversity

«JI25 The adversity element focuses on whether the claimant's
use of land is "against the owner as distinguished from under the
owner." Zollinger v. Frank, 175 P.2d 714, 715 (Utah 1946); accord
Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah 1953); Jacob v. Bate, 2015
UT App 206, j 18, 358 P.3d 346. The Utah Supreme Court has
held that a presumption of adverse use arises "where a claimant
has shown an open and continuous use of the land for the
prescriptive period (20 years in Utah)." Zollinger, 175 P.2d at 716;
see also Jacob, 2015 UT App 206, «JI 18 (same). Once this
presumption comes into play, the burden shifts to the landowner
to rebut it. See Zollinger, 175 P.2d at 716. This generally requires
the landowner to establish[] that the use was initially
permissive." Jacob, 2015 UT App 206, «JI 19 (alteration in original)
II
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(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As we explained
in Jacob, "the presumption of permissive use applies to cases
where there is evidence of a special relationship, such as a
license," and in this regard, "Utah courts have differentiated
between consent or license and mere acquiescence." 2015 UT
App 206, 'I[ 21. Proof of the former-consensual use-rebuts the
adversity presumption; proof of the latter-mere acquiescencedoes not. See id. 'ff'Il 21-22. And notably, the Utah Supreme Court
has explained that adversity does not require "any open
hostility" and that a use can be adverse even if "the
parties ... were friendly, or even cordial with each other(.]" See
Richins v. Struhs, 412 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1966); accord Jacob, 2015
UT App 206, 'I[ 18.

ti

'I[26 Here, because the trial court's findings support its
conclusions that the Judds' use of the Driveway for access was
continuous, open and notorious, and for the required twentyyear period, the court properly presumed the Judds' use for
access purposes to be adverse. Consequently, in order to prevent
the establishment of a prescriptive right to use the Driveway for
access purposes, the Bowens were required to demonstrate that
the Judds' use was permissive.
'I[27 The Bowens contend the adversity presumption was
inapplicable here because "the Bowens opened their driveway
for their own use and the Judds merely used it in the same way
as the Bowens" and that the Judds' "use arose from neighborly
accommodation." As proof, the Bowens refer to what they
characterize as undisputed evidence that, first, the Judds merely
used the Driveway in the same way that the Bowens did (and
only when the Bowens were not already blocking the Driveway),
and second, the Bowens "had a long history of accommodating
the Judds by allowing them to use [the Driveway] as a
turnaround and for additional parking when the Bowen cabin
was not in use."
'I[28 The court found that, although the initial cabin owners
were "good friends," "[t]here was no evidence provided that the
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Circular Driveway was initially a permissive use between the
properties" and that "[t]here is no evidence that at the time of
separation of ownership of the Judd Cabin property and the
Bowen Cabin property that the use of the [Driveway] was
initially permissive." Rather, the proximity of the cabins and
their near simultaneous construction, along with the apparent
lack of any other means of access to the Judds' cabin at the time,
supported a reasonable inference that the use was not simply a
matter of sufferance. Thus, the court deemed the use adverse
and concluded that the use "was neither originally nor
subsequently permissive." Implicit in the trial court's findings is
the determination that the Bowens had not met their burden of
demonstrating that the Judds' use was countenanced pursuant
to a "special relationship" between the parties-in other words,
the Bowens had failed to show that the Judds' use was "under"
rather than "against" the Bowens or their predecessors in
interest. See Jacob, 2015 UT App 206, <j[<j[ 21-22; Homer, 866 P.2d at
627 (explaining that a court's "finding of adverse use is really the
other side of the permission coin" and that such a finding
"implicitly rejects" assertions regarding permissiveness based,
for example, on a person's "opening a way across his or her
property that another uses it without causing damage").
<j[29 Further, the trial court made findings that implicitly
contradict the Bowens' contentions. For example, rather than
finding that the Bowens' predecessors opened the Driveway, the
court found that "the Circular Driveway was constructed" "[a]t
some point" during the 1900s when the cabins were also
constructed. The court further found that the cabins "appeared
to have been built to use the Circular Driveway to access the
respective properties," particularly because the Driveway "is...
in close proximity to each cabin," and that users of both cabins
had "historically accessed their respective properties by using
the Circular Driveway" and that the parties had "amicably
cooperated in the use of the Circular Driveway for access and
parking" for many years before 2006. The trial court did not find
that the Bowens' predecessors alone constructed the Driveway
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or that the Judds made passive use of a way that simply
appeared to be open next to their property. Instead, the trial
court's findings demonstrate that it was a matter of course from
the beginning that both parties used the Driveway for access to
their respective cabins, particularly given the configuration of
the Driveway vis-a-vis both cabins. These findings also show
that the court considered the Judds' use as more than a result of
mere neighborly accommodation on the part of the Bowens. The
court expressly determined that the predecessors of both parties
had from the beginning used the Driveway for access and that
the Judds' use was the result of mutual cooperation and
understanding between the parties, not of one-sided
accommodation on the part of the Bowens.
CJ[30 Moreover, because many of the trial court's factual
findings seem to implicitly contradict the Bowens' contentions
regarding the permissive nature of the Judds' use, the Bowens
cannot successfully persuade us that the trial court's legal
conclusion regarding adversity is in error without challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the court's pertinent
findings. Although the Bowens characterize the evidence
regarding the Judds' permissive use as undisputed and argue
that, as a matter of law, that evidence cannot support the court's
adversity conclusion, the facts relied on by the Bowens appear to
simply be evidence culled from the record that supports their
own arguments, without acknowledging conflicting evidence
that the trial court's findings necessarily resolved. Pointing to
the evidence they believe supports their argument is insufficient
to carry their "heavy burden" of persuading us to "reverse
under the deferential standard of review" we afford to factual
findings. See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, j j 31, 35, 40, 326 P.3d
645 (holding that a party seeking to challenge "the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a factual finding" must "identify and
deal with supportive evidence," because a party who fails to do
so "will never persuade an appellate court to reverse under the
deferential standard of review that applies to such issues").

20140285-CA

15

2017 UT App 56

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Judd v. Bowen

<j[31 For example, though the Bowens claim that the Judds
made only passive use of the Driveway already established by
the Bowens' predecessors, they fail to identify any evidence that
establishes that the Bowens unilaterally opened the Driveway
for access only to their own cabin property. See Buckley v. Cox,
247 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 1952) (explaining that, "where a person
opens a way for the use of his own premises, and another person
also uses it without causing damage, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, such use by the latter is permissive"). Further,
the Bowens fail to acknowledge that, while there may have been
some testimony at trial involving the Bowens' accommodation of
the Judds' use, there was also testimony that the Judds had long
used the Driveway for access continuously as a matter of course,
without seeking permission to do so or believing that any
permission was required. To the extent this represented a
conflict in the evidence, it was the trial court's prerogative to
resolve it. Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, 119, 186 P.3d 978
("[W]e may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court
as trial courts are in a better position to weigh conflicting
evidence and evaluate the credibility of witness testimony.").
<j[32 As a result, we are not persuaded that the trial court's
factual findings cannot support its legal conclusion that the
Judds' use of the Driveway for access purposes was neither
initially nor subsequently permissive. Rather, the court's
findings support the conclusion that the Judds' use was not the
result of a special relationship, such as use by consent or license,
between the two parties. See Jacob v. Bate, 2015 UT App 206,
1121-22, 358 P.3d 346 (explaining that the presumption of
permissive use "applies to cases where there is evidence of a
special relationship," such as where there is consent or license to
use). And more to the point, the court's findings also
demonstrate that the court rejected the Bowens' characterization
of the Judds' use as permissive as well as the evidence that may
have conflicted with that conclusion. See Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d
622,627 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Thus, we are unpersuaded that the

iJ

~

(ijJ

20140285-CA

16

2017 UT App 56

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Judd v. Bowen

trial court erred when it determined that the Judds' use of the
Driveway for access purposes was ad verse. 4
'1[33 In sum, we conclude that the Bowens have not
demonstrated that the trial court erred in concluding that the
Judds had established a prescriptive right to use the Driveway
for access purposes-in other words, that their use of the
Driveway for access was continuous, open and notorious, and
adverse for the requisite period of time. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court's conclusion that the Judds had "acquired a
prescriptive easement to use the Circular Driveway for
reasonable access ... purposes."

B.

Parking

'1[34 While we affirm the trial court's conclusion that the Judds
have acquired a prescriptive easement to use the Driveway for
access to their cabin property, we reverse the trial court's
conclusion that the Judds acquired an easement to use the
Driveway for parking purposes. The trial court concluded that
all the elements of a prescriptive easement had been met to
establish that the Judds had also acquired a parking easement on
the Driveway. It found that the Driveway is a "narrow" right-ofway "wide enough for only one vehicle" and that, in the past,
users of both cabins "had parked on or near the Circular
Driveway" as well as "in [its] center portion." The cowt then
ordered that the Bowens "should take no action that would
prohibit users of the Judd Cabin to continue their historic use of
the Circular Driveway for access and parking associated with
use of the Judd Cabin" and that both parties "should allow
appropriate parking that does not interfere with either' s use of
the cabins."

4. To the extent that the Bowens have addressed "under a claim
of right" as a separate element in their arguments, we have
considered it in connection with our adversity analysis.
(i)
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<j[35 The Bowens argue that a prescriptive parking right "is
outside the scope of a prescriptive easement." They contend that
a prescriptive right for parking is inconsistent with the concept
of prescriptive easements because, in effect, it provides a "right
to exclude the [landowner, in this case, the Bowens] from using
their own property." The Bowens compare the parking easement
sought by the Judds to the circumstances in Nyman v. Anchor
Dev., LLC, 2003 UT 27, 73 P.3d 357, arguing that the reasoning
employed by the Utah Supreme Court in Nyman compels the
conclusion that granting the Judds a prescriptive parking right
was an error as a matter of law. They also contend that we ought
to be persuaded by cases outside of Utah that have suggested a
parking easement is inconsistent with a prescriptive right and is
instead more akin to rights sought through adverse possession.
See Mehdizadeh v. Mincer, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284, 289-92 (Cal Ct.
App. 1996); Cohen v. Quarry Estates LLC, 6 Pa. D. & C. 5th 388,
394-97 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2006).

i)

i,i

iJ

<j[36 While we need not decide here whether a parking
easement is categorically inconsistent with a prescriptive
easement as a matter of law, we agree with the Bowens that a
prescriptive parking right in these circumstances more closely
resembles the sort of rights typically associated with adverse
possession rather than the more limited easement rights
acquirable by prescription. Because the land at issue here is a
small area involving a narrow, one-car-wide driveway situated
"in close proximity to each cabin," we conclude that granting the
Judds a prescriptive right to park in any location on the Bowens'
property that is on, around, or in the center of the Driveway
impermissibly excludes the Bowens from meaningful "use and
enjoyment" of the Driveway and the surrounding land at all
times that the Judds exercise their right to park on it.

1.

Adverse Possession Versus Prescriptive Easement

~

<j[37 The claims of prescriptive easement and adverse
possession are similar. Rotenberger v. Burghduff, 2007 SD 19, 1( 12
& n.8, 729 N.W.2d 175, 179 n.8; see also 28A C.J.S. Easements § 23
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(2016) (explaining that "the elements necessary for a prescriptive
easement resemble those necessary for adverse possession").
Both rely upon the claimant establishlng that the kind of use
they have made of another's land is open and sufficient to put
the landowner on notice of the use, that the use is hostile and
adverse, that the use is continuous, and that the use continued
for the requisite period. See generally Allred ex rel. Jensen v. Allred,
2008 UT 22, en 17, 182 P.3d 337 (listing the elements required to
establish adverse possession); Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192,
en 18, 186 P.3d 978 (listing the elements for a prescriptive
easement claim); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-2-212 to -214
(LexisNexis 2012) (setting out the requirements for establishing a
claim of adverse possession). And importantly, in both contexts,
it has been recognized that a one-size-fits-all approach is not
appropriate to determining whether a particular use has
matured into either possession or a limited right of use. See
Allred, 2008 UT 22, ':II 21 (noting that the possession of land
necessary to establish ad verse possession "cannot be uniform in
every case" and that "there may be degrees in the exclusiveness
even of the exercise of ownership" (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,
311 (Utah 1998) (plurality opinion) (noting that whether a
prescriptive easement exists is a "type of highly fact-dependent
question, with numerous potential fact patterns").
en38 While the elements of the claims are similar, however, the
character of the use and the rights available under each are not.
Ad verse possession, as its name suggests, is an avenue by which
a claimant may acquire a possessory interest in the land at issue.
See 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements & Licenses in Real Property§ 39 (2016)
(explaining that "adverse possession deals with possession" and
"operates to divest title to the land at issue"); 3 Am. Jur. 2d
Adverse Possession§ 2 (2016) (defining adverse possession "as the
open and notorious possession and occupation of real property
under an evident claim or color of right or, in other words, a
possession in opposition to the true title and record owner-a
possession commenced in wrong and maintained in right"). The
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successful adverse possession claimant gains the right to treat
the property at issue as an ownership interest and may
accordingly exercise the rights typical of landowners over the
property. See Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC, 2010 UT
29, «j[ 25, 232 P.3d 999 (explaining that "[t]he uses a possessor in
land may make of the space within his possession are, in general,
undefined and are limited only by the rights of others" (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)). This includes the right
to use and occupy the land to the exclusion of others. See id.
("[O]ne with a possessory interest has the right and intention to
exclude other members of society in general from any present
occupation of the land." (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); cf Hill v. Superior Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60,
«j[ 24,321 P.3d 1054 (explaining that, among the rights associated
with those who have "the control of a landowner in actual
occupation of property'' is the "right to exclude others from the
property altogether").
«j[39 The type of right acquired through adverse possession is
reflected in the type of use that must be made by the claimant
during the required period. Adverse possession claimants must
demonstrate that they have actually possessed the land. See
Allred, 2008 UT 22, «j[«j[ 18-21 (explaining that "actual possession
and occupation" is a requirement of adverse possession). This
makes sense; a person should not be permitted to acquire an
ownership interest over the property of another unless they
have, during the required period, acted as though they actually
owned the land. However, the actual possession required to
prove the claim will not be the same in every case. Our supreme
court has recognized that "actual possession is a flexible term,
and the use of property necessary to establish it will vary with
the character of the property." Allred, 2008 UT 22, en 21 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse
Possession § 18 (2016) ("The determination of what acts amount
to actual possession of property ... depends upon and varies
with the nature, character, and location of the property. In other
words, the type of possessory acts necessary to constitute actual
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possession ... in one case may not be essential in another, due
to the character and location of the property." (footnotes
omitted)). Titls generally means that the "claimant's use of the
property ... need be only the ordinary use an owner would
make of [the land]"-that is, it need only "comport[] with the
ordinary management of similar lands by their owners[.]" 3 Am.
Jur. 2d Adverse Possession§ 19 (2016).

Gj

G.i

<j[40 Ultimately, the "pivotal consideration" underlying the
actual possession of the land is that it be "of such character or
under such circumstances that the owner knows, or as a man of
ordinary prudence should know, that the land was being held as
his own by an adverse claimant." Scott v. Hansen, 422 P.2d 525,
528-29 (Utah 1966); accord Cooper v. Carter Oil Co., 316 P.2d 320,
323 (Utah 1957) ("It is to be kept in mind that the primary reason
we are concerned with the nature of the defendant's possession
is for the purpose of determining what notice it would give to
the owners and to the world that he claimed ownership of the
property."). In this regard, our courts have found sufficient the
actual possession from a variety of uses ranging from physical
occupation of the land through construction of permanent
structures and improvements to exclusive occupation of grazing
land for three weeks every year. See, e.g., Falconaero Enter., Inc. v.
Valley Inv. Co., 395 P.2d 915, 916 (Utah 1964) (holding that the
claimant had established adverse possession where the claimant
had enclosed the land with an electric fence, built improvements
and created an artificial lake on the land, grazed the land, and
conducted a commercial enterprise on the land for seven
consecutive years); Cooper, 316 P.2d at 323--24 (holding that a
claimant's possession of the property for grazing purposes was
sufficient to establish his right to the land through adverse
possession even though the claimant actually occupied the land
only "for a period of about three weeks each year," where "the
property in question was unfenced grazing land" and the
claimant used it each year "until all the feed was grazed off").
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cir41 A prescriptive easement claimant, on the other hand, does
not need to show actual possession or occupation of the land to
acquire the right. This is because prescriptive easements are
nonpossessory interests-the right acquired by the successful
easement claimant is not one of possession or occupation. See

Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization,
2012 UT 4, cir 22 n.26, 270 P.3d 441 (explaining that "an easement
is a nonpossessory interest in land owned by another person");
see also Restatement (First) of Property: Easements Introductory
Note (1944) ("The presence or absence of the privilege of
exclusive occupation marks the dividing line between
possessory and nonpossessory interests."). An easement is an
incorporeal right. See Clawson v. Wallace, 52 P. 9, 10-11 (Utah
1898) (explaining that an easement "is incorporeal" and that it is
a right "incapable of possession or occupancy"); 28A C.J.S.
Easements § 5 (2016) (explaining that one of the "essential
qualities of easements" is that "they are incorporeal" rights
"imposed on corporeal property"). It is a property interest that
consists of the privilege to merely use-rather than occupy or
possess-the land of another for a circumscribed, limited
purpose. See Alliant Techsystems, 2012 UT 4, cir 22 n.26 (explaining
that an easement consists of "the right to use the land"); Nyman
v. Anchor Dev., LLC, 2003 UT 27, cir 18, 73 P.3d 357 ("[T]he term
'use' implies an inherent distinction in the property rights
conferred by an easement, on the one hand, and outright
ownership, on the other."). "A prescriptive easement does not
result in ownership, but allows only use of property belonging
to another for a limited purpose," Nyman, 2003 UT 27, <Jl 18
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), one "that is not
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner,"
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements & Licenses§ 1 (2016).
cir42 As a result, a successful prescriptive easement claimant
does not (and, in fact, cannot) gain the right to occupy or possess
the landowner's property. Indeed, the claimed right to use may
not be "inconsistent with either the [landowner's] ownership
interest or the general property right of the owner, or the general

20140285-CA

22

2017 UT App 56

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l;J

iJ

Judd v. Bowen

use of the property by the owner." 28A C.J.S. Easements§ 1 (2016)
(footnotes omitted). This means, in practical terms, that the
prescriptive easement itself may not be of such a character that,
when exercised,- it operates to effectively divest the landowner of
his or her ownership rights in the property-that is, the
easement cannot "create the practical equivalent of an estate."
See 28A C.J.S. Easements § 32 (2016) (explaining that a "party
must satisfy the elements of an adverse possession rather than a
prescriptive easement where an easement would create the
practical equivalent of an estate"). Rather, the rights of the
easement holder and the landowner must be capable of being
balanced so as to afford each the ability to "use and enjoy" the
rights attendant to use the property for a limited purpose on the
one hand and ownership on the other. See North Union Canal Co.
v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 179 (Utah 1976) (explaining that the
easement holder is entitled only to "have the right to use and
enjoy his easement to the fullest extent possible not inconsistent
with" the landowner's rights while the landowner is entitled to
"have the use and enjoyment of his property to the highest
degree possible," while accounting for the easement).
1(43 Determining the appropriate boundary between the
rights of a prescriptive easement holder and a landowner is not
an easy task. But a review of cases in which our courts have
awarded or affirmed awards of prescriptive easements suggests
that the balance has been struck by limiting the scope of a
prescriptive easement to the sort of transitory uses which place
relatively minimal burdens on the landowner's own use of the
property. For example, most prescriptive easements consist of
one version or another of a right merely to pass over another's
land, such as a right-of-way, for purposes related to access or
ingress and egress. See, e.g., Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah
1998) (concluding that each party owned an easement over a
common lane for access purposes); Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062
(Utah 1984) (affirming the award of an easement to a grazing
association to drive cattle over a limited area of a property twice
a year); Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948,948 (Utah 1977)
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(awarding the plaintiffs a prescriptive easement to cross over "a
rough road across defendant's land"); Richins v. Struhs, 412 P.2d
314 (Utah 1966) (concluding that claimants had established a
prescriptive easement to use a common driveway and bridge
approaching the adjoining properties for access purposes);
Zollinger v. Frank, 175 P.2d 714 (Utah 1946) (affirming the
claimant's right to use a strip of his neighbor's land for access to
his land from a public road); Jacob v. Bate, 2015 UT App 206, err 12,
358 P.3d 346 (affirming the trial court's decision that the
claimants had established an easement "for ingress and egress"
of an alley adjacent to their commercial building "for proper
maintenance of the adjacent buildings" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, 186 P.3d 978
(affirming the trial court's award to easement claimant of right to
use a lane to access the rear of his property); Martinez v. Wells,
2004 UT App 43, 88 P.3d 343 (affirming a prescriptive easement
for claimants to use a historic dirt roadway for ingress and
egress purposes); Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) (affirming a prescriptive easement for the claimant's use of
a right-of-way across the front and rear parking areas of an
adjacent landowner's property to reach his building).

6\tJ

144

And we have been unable to find any case affirming the
establishment of a prescriptive easement where the right sought
involved more than a transitory, occasional intrusion on the
landowner's property. Cf Nyman, 2003 UT 27, <_[[ 18 (noting that
"no prior Utah case recognize[s] a prescriptive easement right to
maintain a permanent structure on someone else's property").
Indeed, in Nyman, our supreme court reiterated the limited
character of the easement right. The plaintiff claimed a
prescriptive right to occupy a small portion of the landowner's
property for an encroaching garage. Id. <_[[ 17. Our supreme court
rejected the claimant's argument that the small size of the
portion of the lot occupied by the garage made it legally
insignificant. Instead, it concluded that the "the garage's
intrusion onto [the lot] is not so small as to be truly
inconsequential" and held that the plaintiff was "not entitled to a
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prescriptive easement because the property right that he claims
would effectively deprive [the landowner] of all rights to which,
as record owner, he is entitled." Id. 118. It reasoned that "[a]
prescriptive easement ... allows only use of property belonging
to another for a limited pwpose" and that "[w ]henever there is
ownership of property subject to an easement there is a
dichotomy of interests, both of which must be respected and
kept in balance." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). It determined that "a balance between the rights of the
fee title owner and a purported easement holder becomes
impossible where the latter asserts a right to permanent
exclusive occupancy of the fee title-owner's land." Id.
~

145 In sum, then, the defining difference between adverse
possession and prescriptive easement is the character of the
interest sought-whether the interest may be characterized as
possessory or nonpossessory. If the character of the interest
sought is essentially possessory, it moves into the realm of
adverse possession, not prescriptive easement. We acknowledge
that the line between possession and use is not always easily
discernible. Cf Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah
1998) (plurality opinion) ("The finding that an easement exists is
a conclusion of law. Such a finding is, however, the type of
highly fact-dependent question, with numerous potential fact
patterns, which accords the trial judge a broad measure of
discretion[.]"). Indeed, our courts have repeatedly recognized
that the particular circumstances of a case determine the
character of the use and, in the end, whether the property rights
sought by a claimant may be established. E.g., Allred ex rel. Jensen
v. Allred, 2008 UT 22, err 21, 182 P.3d 337 (noting that the
possession necessary in adverse possession is "a flexible term"
and that "the use of property necessary to establish it will vary
with the character of the property"); Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App
192, <j[ 9, 186 P.3d 978 (noting that the conclusion that a
prescriptive easement exists, while a question of law, "is so factdependent that trial courts are generally accorded 'a broad
measure of discretion when applying the correct legal standard

~
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to the given set of facts"' (quoting Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 311)).
Nonetheless, the doctrines of prescriptive easement and adverse
possession each have their conceptual limits, as we have
discussed above, and it is helpful to visualize the uses that may
constitute possession or easement by prescription as falling
along a spectrum, with outright ownership on the one end and
very limited uses, such as passage twice a year over another's
property, see Crane, 683 P.2d at 1064, 1068, on the other. The
question before us is where on that spectrum the right the Judds
sought fell and ultimately whether that use was consistent, as a
matter of law, with the nature of the right asserted. See Valcarce,
961 P.2d at 311 (clarifying that we afford significant discretion to
the trial judge in making the finding that an easement has been
established when the trial judge "appl[ies] the correct legal
standard").
146 Accordingly, for us to determine if the parking right
sought in this case is consistent with the concept of prescriptive
easement, we must determine whether, under the particular
circumstances, the character of the parking right sought was
more similar to possession or transitory use, keeping in mind
that, as discussed, an easement by prescription may not intrude
so far into the landowner's rights so as to effectively deprive him
or her of meaningful exercise of either use or ownership of the
property at issue. See Nyman v. Anchor Dev., LLC, 2003 UT 27,
err 18, 73 P.3d 357.
2.

The Parking Right

The trial court awarded the Judds a prescriptive easement
to park on the Bowens' property according to their "historic
use," which it found included parking "on or near the Circular
Driveway'' as well as "in the center portion" of the Driveway. In
other words, the court did not limit parking to the track of the
Driveway itself. Rather, the court established in favor of the
Judds a right to park on, around, or in the center of a narrow
driveway situated on a "small area," which currently "is wide
enough for only one vehicle," "in close proximity to each cabin,"
err47
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where historic use has required the parties to "cooperate in a
neighborly and amicable fashion" to accommodate both parties'
needs. We conclude that the right to park in favor of the Judds
intrudes too far into the Bowens' ownership rights to fit within
the limited scope of a prescriptive easement. In particular,
because the Judds sought to establish a right to park on
essentially a first-come, first-served basis, where their own
parking may continue open-endedly and their right to park may
not be prevented or interrupted by the Bowens, we conclude
that the right sought is not limited to mere use but extends
beyond the concept of an easement and into the realm of
occupation and possession.
<jJ:48 To begin with, the trial court found that there is very
limited land available on or immediately adjacent to the
Driveway, that the parties had historically parked all around
and in the center of the Driveway, and that the parties have had
to accommodate each other's parking use. These findings were
corroborated at trial by evidence that the parties' need for the
land overlapped; the Bowens and the Judds testified that there
were times when the Bowens requested that the Judds move a
parked vehicle that was impeding Bowen use and that
occasionally the Judds had to "work around" times that a Bowen
user was parked on the Driveway upon their arrival. Judd users
also testified that they would park anywhere there was space on
or around the Driveway when they arrived, which included the
available land on, in the center of, and around the Driveway's
track. In other words, given the limited available land, the
parties' need for parking at times overlapped and brought them
into competition for the limited space available, which not only
required accommodation but seemed to extend at times to a
first-come, first-served occupation.
Qi

«J[49 As a consequence, the parking right sought by the Judds
more closely resembles occupation and possession, because it
permits the Judds to physically exclude and prevent the Bowens
from using a portion of their property for the indeterminate time
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during which the Judds occupy it. It also requires the Bowens
during times of Judd occupation to cede to the Judds their own
competing right as the landowner to use the implicated land in
any way, even in the same manner as the Judds. See Cohen v.
Quarry Estates LLC, 6 Pa. D. & C. 5th 388, 397 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
2006) (explaining that the plaintiffs' claim for an easement to
park on the landowner's property was "in actuality a claim for
adverse possession of the [landowner's] property," because the
plaintiffs were requesting the court "to prevent [the
landowner] ... from exercising its rights to the property"); 28A
C.J.S. Easements § 4 (2016) ("An easement is a right to use the
land burdened by the easement rather than a right to occupy and
possess the land as does an estate owner."). The Judds sought
the right to park either on or adjacent to the Driveway on the
Bowens' property without limit as to time frame· or location
within the affected property, essentially on a first-come, firstserved basis, without interruption or prevention by the Bowens.
But such a right gives the Judds the ability to wholly exclude the
Bowens from that portion of the already limited land available
for the Bowens' own parking, access, and general enjoyment as
owners, so long as the Judds occupy the space before the Bowens
do and for as long as their stay at the Judd cabin may last. The
only constraint on the Judds' use, other than the court's
admonition to refrain from generally blocking and interfering
with the Bowens' use of their own cabin, appears to be the
practical limits that come from the fact that Judd users are not
necessarily in residence on a permanent basis and a Bowen user
may be there first. Compare Nyman, 2003 UT 27, <j[ 18 (explaining
that physical occupation is inconsistent with the limited use
permitted through prescriptive easements), with Crane v. Crane,
683 P.2d 1062, 1068 (Utah 1984) (affirming a prescriptive right for
grazing association claimants to pass over a portion of the
landowner's property twice a year as part of a cattle drive).
<j[S0 We acknowledge that intermittent parking is a more
limited intrusion than, for example, the permanent structure in
Nyman. But here the property at issue has very limited space
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available for parking, and the court's findings and record
evidence portray a history of overlapping demand for use of the
affected property by both the Judds and the Bowens, which
would inevitably continue under the court's easement
determination. Indeed, a prescriptive parking right in favor of
the Judds essentially permits them to exclude the landowner
from the same property during the period of occupation, a
period seemingly limited only by the Judds' discretion as to the
timing and duration of their cabin stays. In these circumstances,
the parking right seems further along the spectrum toward
adverse possession than toward prescriptive easement, which
involves more limited and transitory uses than are present here.
See Nyman, 2003 UT 27, <JI 18 (noting that even seemingly small
occupation intrusions are generally inconsistent with the rights
created by prescriptive easements).

Ci

'ii

151 Indeed, in light of the limited land available and the
parties' competing needs, the prescriptive parking easement
awarded by the trial court seems to create a type of time-share
interest in the Driveway and the surrounding land that more
closely resembles a shared ownership interest in favor of the
Judds than the transitory use typical of an easement or right-ofway. See South Ridge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Brown, 2010 UT App
23, <JI 3,226 P.3d 758 (defining "timeshare" as a joint ownership
or rental of a vacation lodging (such as a condominium) by
several persons with each occupying the premises in turn
for short periods'" (quoting Timeshare, Merriam-Webster.com,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/timeshare) [https://
perma.cc/X3ZR-4BA2]; NTS Am. Jur. 2d Real Estate Time-Sharing
§ 1 (2016) (explaining that "time-sharing involves the division of
ownership of resort property into a number of fixed time periods
during which each purchaser has the exclusive right of use and
occupation"). In effect, the court's order permits the Judds, as
with a timeshare, to treat the Driveway and surrounding
property as their own and to entirely exclude the Bowens from
use or occupation of that property for the duration of a
particular stay. See N1S Am. Jur. 2d Real Estate Time-Sharing§ 1
111
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(2016); see also Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization, 2012 UT 4, en 28, 270 P.3d 441 (defining "exclusive
possession" as a state where "the user or possessor must have
this right over a definite space for a definite time"); cf Gillmor v.
Gillmor, 694 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1984) (defining "exclusive
use" in the context of cotenancy as "mean[ing] more than one
cotenant using the entire property; it requires either an act of
exclusion or use of such a nature that it necessarily prevents
another cotenant from exercising his rights in the property").
The court's order also grants the Judds a level of control over the
Driveway and the surrounding area more indicative of the
exclusivity inherent in a time-share interest than that in a
transitory use. See Alliant, 2012 UT 4, en 28 (explaining that an
"example[] of the type of control needed for exclusive possession
[is] ... the general power to admit or exclude others, including
the property owner, from any present occupation of the
property"). In particular, other than the admonition against
blocking and inappropriate interference with the Bowens' use,
the order leaves it up to the Judds' discretion to determine the
timing, duration, and location of a particular parking stay. Based
upon their historic parking patterns, the Judds apparently may
park at any location on, near, or in the center of the Driveway so
long as it is not already occupied by the Bowens. And the Judds'
arguments on appeal certainly imply that they have earned by
prescription the right to park and remain parked on the portions
of the Bowens' land implicated by their historic use whenever
they choose and for whatever length of time they or their guests
choose, without interruption or prevention by the Bowens.
en52 Further, even if the parking is itself only intermittent, the
parking right granted seems to require that the Driveway and
adjacent land be reserved for the Judds' exclusive use for
whenever they may be in a position to occupy it. This excludes
the Bowens from the land in a way that is conceptually
inconsistent with the limited intrusions on the landowner's
rights which are typical of a prescriptive easement. See id. This is
illustrated best by the trial cowt's general admonition to the
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parties to cooperate to avoid conflict in the exercise of their
competing rights of occupation. The admonition to cool?erate
indicates that both parties have a near-equal right to occupy
portions of the Driveway or the surrounding property for
parking purposes as co-owners would. See Coowner, Black's Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("Someone who is in concurrent
ownership, possession, and enjoyment of property with one or
more others," such as a "tenant in common" or a "joint tenant").
In other words, the admonition to cooperate seems to elevate the
Judds' property interest to a level equivalent to the landowner's
because it requires the Bowens not to interfere with the Judds'
right to occupy the property-whether the Driveway track itself
or the land near or at the center of it-at their will, subject only
to an obligation to cooperate that seems to be imposed equally
on both parties. Put another way, the parking right requires the
Bowens to preserve the entirety of the affected land for use by a
co-occupant with essentially equivalent rights. This burden
seems different in kind from the sort of minor accommodation
that might be necessary in the case of a prescriptive right-of-way,
where the landowner's conceptual exclusion is limited only to
refraining from general use and enjoyment that unreasonably
restricts or interferes with the easement holder's limited
privilege of use. 5 See McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996,997 (Utah
5. We also note that the parking right the Judds sought to
establish-one that permits them to park without interruption
by the Bowens-does not seem to be entirely consistent with the
evidence regarding the more recent parking patterns between
the parties. From the evidence presented at trial, it appears that
on the occasions when a Bowen user requested that a Judd user
move a parked vehicle to permit the Bowens' own parking, the
Judd user complied (at least until the incident in 2008 that
seemed to spark this litigation, where a. Judd user for the first
time refused to move a parked vehicle at the Bowens' request).
See supra CJ:rll 4-5. But the trial court's decision granted a parking
right to the Judds which now requires the Bowens to
(continued ... )
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1978); North Union Canal Co. v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 179 (Utah
1976); see also Nyman v. Anchor Dev., LLC, 2003 UT 27, <j[ 18, 73
P.3d 357 (suggesting that the concept of a prescriptive easement
is inconsistent with a right of exclusive occupation); 28A C.J.S.
Easements § 1 (2016) (" An easement is the right to use the land of
another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with either
the other's ownership interest or the general property right of
the owner, or the general use of the property by the owner."
(footnotes omitted)). It also necessarily makes impossible a
balancing between the landowner's right to use and enjoy his
property to the "highest degree possible" against an easement
holder's right to enjoy only his easement to the "fullest extent
possible not inconsistent with the rights of the fee owner." See
Newell, 550 P.2d at 179. If the easement holder's rights are on a
level near-equal to the landowner's, they are directly competing
with the landowner's rights, and striking the proper balance
between the interests of the parties cannot be accomplished. Cf
Nyman, 2003 UT 27, <j[ 18 (noting that "[m]aintaining ... a
balance between the rights of the fee title owner and a purported
easement holder becomes impossible where the latter asserts a
right to permanent exclusive occupancy of the fee title owner's
land").

~

<j[53 In this regard, as urged by the Bowens, we find the
court's reasoning in Cohen v. Quarry Estates LLC, 6 Pa. D. & C. 5th
388 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2006), to be persuasive. In Cohen, the
plaintiffs were several homeowners who claimed that they had
established an easement to park in a lot located to the rear of
their residential street. Id. at 389. The court determined that the

(... continued)
accommodate the Judds' parking in a way that is more
consistent with joint ownership than with the more limited
concept of a prescriptive easement and seems to depart from the
balance the parties themselves seemed to observe, at least in
more recent times.
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various plaintiffs had not proven their prescriptive right with
"clear and positive" evidence, and therefore they were unable to
establish that they and their predecessors had parked on the lot
for the required twenty-one-year period or that their use was
adverse. Id. at 394-97. The court went on to explain, however,
that even if the evidence had established that the plaintiffs' use
met the required elements, their request for a prescriptive
easement to park on the defendants' property was "in actuality a
claim for adverse possession of the defendant's property." Id. at
397. The court explained that "[b ]y claiming that they have
established their right to park on the lot, plaintiffs are in effect
asking for a court to prevent defendant, the property owner,
from exercising its rights to the property," which included the
right to build on and improve it, as the landowner desired to do.
Id. The court then compared a prescriptive easement to adverse
possession, stating that a "prescriptive easement differs from
adverse possession in that with an easement the claimant has
made some use of the owner's land, while ad verse possession
requires exclusivity and possession or occupation." Id. The court
found that the plaintiffs had not asserted "that they used the
property in question to the exclusion of the owner," and it
ultimately determined that the plaintiffs "are not entitled to
exclusive possession of the lot without establishing that they
have met the requirements for a claim of adverse possession." Id.
Similarly, in the circumstances here involving limited land
inherently subject to the parties' overlapping and competing
needs, the Judds' parking claim is in essence a claim to prevent
the Bowens from exercising the rights inherent in their
ownership, such as the rights to exclude and generally use and
enjoy their property.
<j[54 Finally, while the potential for conflict between the parties
does not alone preclude the establishment of a prescriptive
easement, the apparent impracticability in this case of managing
the competing needs and desires of both parties to park in the
same space given the physical constraints of the Driveway and
surrounding areas underscores how unsuitable the legal concept
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of a prescriptive parking easement is to the circumstances here.
Significantly, the parties themselves have struggled to find a
workable accommodation that would allow both sides to
amicably use the Driveway for reasonable access and parking.
They returned to the trial court to resolve recurring disputes,
which resulted in ever greater constraints on the Bowens' use of
a significant portion of their property, but even those constraints
apparently have not managed to fully resolve the conflicts
despite the court's best efforts. In essence, the intractability of the
continuing conflicts between the parties arises from the attempt
to impose a parking right that seems inherently incompatible
with the Bowens' ownership rights in the underlying land and
therefore beyond the proper scope of a prescriptive easement.
«JI55 In sum, the rights inhering in the trial court's awarding of
a parking easement in favor of the Judds effectively elevate the
Judds' interest to one that more closely resembles a possessory
interest rather than a simple right of temporary use. In
particular, the parking right appears to grant the Judds a right to
exclude both physically and conceptually the Bowens from use
or enjoyment of the property at issue-a right that is typically
only associated with possession. Cf Hill v. Superior Prop. Mgmt.
Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60, «JI 24, 321 P.3d 1054 (explaining that,
among the rights associated with those who have "the control of
a landowner in actual occupation of property," is "the right to
exclude others from the property altogether"). The Judds'
parking right therefore seems to create an imbalance in the
proper weighing of interests between the two parties. See Newell,
550 P.2d at 179 ("Whenever there is ownership of property
subject to an easement there is a dichotomy of interests, both of
which must be respected and kept in balance."). As a result, we
conclude that the trial court erred when it granted the Judds a
prescriptive easement to park on, in the center of, and
immediately around the Driveway.
«JI56 Thus, the Judds may use the Driveway pursuant to the
access easement the trial court awarded below, and the Bowens
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must accommodate this use. But the Judds have not established
a right to a prescriptive easement to park on the Bowens' land.
II. Scope of the Prescriptive Easement
157 The Bowens also argue that the trial court exceeded its
discretion regarding the scope of the easement it awarded.
Because we have concluded that the Judds are not entitled to a
parking easement, we address the question of scope only in
relation to the Judds' prescriptive access easement.

Gi@

Ci

158 "The general rule is that the extent of a prescriptive
easement is measured and limited by its historic use during the
prescriptive period." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312
(Utah 1998) (plurality opinion); accord Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d
270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This means that the "purpose for
which the easement was acquired" limits both the extent of the
easement right granted as well as the physical boundaries of the
easement itself. Whitesides v. Green, 44 P. 1032, 1033 (Utah 1896);
accord Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, 11 30-32, 186 P.3d 978.
The easement holder may not be granted a right "which places a
greater burden on the [landowner]" than during the prescriptive
period. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148,
164 (Utah 1946)). The physical extent of the easement is a
"question of reasonable necessity." Id. at 158 (noting that while
the "substance of the easement is shown by the usage," "the
form [of the easement] ... is a question of reasonable necessity").
And what is reasonably necessary to effectuate the prescriptive
right "must be determined from a consideration of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to the case." Whitesides, 44 P. at 1033;
accord Lance, 2008 UT App 192, <_[[<_[[ 30-32.
159 The Bowens argue that the trial court's orders relating to
the access easement are inconsistent with the Judds' historic use
and that the orders relating to the decorative border, the
walkway, and the foliage exceeded its discretion.
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A.

Access

160 In its order, the trial court ruled that the Judds had
"proven their entitlement to a Prescriptive Easement for use of
the Circular Driveway" and that the Judds and their visitors
"hold a Prescriptive Easement to use the Circular Driveway for
reasonable access ... purposes associated with their usage of the
Judd Property." In the same ruling, the court ordered that
"[b]oth parties are ... to refrain from blocking any users of the
Judd Property and the Bowen property from ingress and egress
on the Circular Driveway." The Bowens contend that these
orders are inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial,
which they characterize as indicating that the Judds used the
Driveway only for access when the Bowens were not already
parked on it and that, in recent years at least, the Bowens had
"interrupted the Judds' use of the driveway whenever the Judds'
use conflicted with their own," not the other way around.
Accordingly, the Bowens argue that "at most, the Judds'
easement is limited to using the Bowens' driveway for access to
the Judd cabin when it does not interfere with the Bowens' use."
161 We disagree. Rather than address the scope of permissible
use of the easement, the Bowens' argument seems to implicate
the court's legal conclusion that the Judds' use of the Driveway
for access purposes met the prescriptive easement element that
the prior use had been continuous. But, as we explained above,
supra ,r 21, although there was some evidence that some Judd
users on rare occasions were unable to use the Driveway for
access purposes because a Bowen user was parked on it, there
were other Judd users who testified that they used the Driveway
for access every time they had need to. This was a conflict in the
evidence the trial court was entitled to resolve, and the Bowens
have not demonstrated that the trial court's findings that
support its continuity conclusion were inadequate or clearly
erroneous. And, as explained, the contentions regarding the
Bowens' interruption of the Judds' parking do not implicate the
access right, which is the only prescriptive easement the Judds
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have acquired. Furthermore, because we have concluded that
the Judds are not entitled to a parking easement, the only party
whose use of the Driveway for access is at risk of hindrance by
parking is the Judds, not the Bowens. The Judds are entitled only
to use the Driveway as a temporary passage to reach and exit
their property as they have in the past, which may, at times,
require some accommodation on the part of the Bowens to
ensure that the Judds are able to use and enjoy their access
easement "to the fullest extent possible not inconsistent with the
rights of [the Bowens]." See North Union Canal Co. v. Newell, 550
P.2d 178, 179 (Utah 1976).
1[62 As discussed above, prescriptive rights require a balance
between the right of ownership and the limited use right, with
respect to both. Id. The Bowens are therefore entitled to use and
enjoy the Driveway "to the highest degree possible, not
inconsistent with the easement." See id. This includes being able
to park on the Driveway, but with the understanding that they
will need to do so in a manner that still permits the Judds to
reasonably exercise their right to use it for access, something that
may, for example, require them to move parked vehicles on
request when they block the Judds' access or otherwise make
arrangements to ensure that they do not render the Judds unable
to make reasonable use of their access easement. See id. at 180
(noting that an easement holder is entitled to ''have the right to
use and enjoy his easement to the fullest extent possible not
inconsistent with the rights of the fee owner"); see also id.
(concluding that a landowner does not need to obtain
permission from the easement holder for installing certain
improvements on land subject to an easement because the
landowner may "use their property in any manner they please
so long as they do not unreasonably restrict or interfere with the
proper use of the plaintiffs easement"); Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v.
Stevenson, 97 P. 26, 27 (Utah 1908) (concluding that the easement
holder may be subject to some reasonable inconvenience and
delay in exercising his right of way, such as having to "unhook
the team [of horses] on one side of the fence, drive the team
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through the gateway, and rehitch it to the rope on the other side
of the [two] fence[s]" installed by the landowner on the land
subject to an easement located half a mile apart).

B.

Foliage, Walkway, and Border

<:[63 The trial court found that in the past there had been "less
vegetation" on the Driveway and that while witnesses "testified
that cars historically parked in the center portion" of the
Driveway, users were unable to park in the center any longer. It
also found that, in addition to the Driveway, the Bowens once
had a private driveway they used for parking that went up the
western side of the cabin," but that "[a]t some point, the Bowen
Cabin users changed the ... [private] driveway to a walkway
with decorative rock outlining the path." At some point, the
Bowens apparently lined the Driveway with a decorative rock
border, as well. In the January 2015 order, the trial court clarified
and added to its March 2014 order in response to disputes that
had arisen between the parties about the scope of the Judds'
prescriptive rights, mostly related to parking issues. The court
ordered (1) that the Bowens "remove the decorative rock border
from the circular driveway and ... restore the walkway adjacent
to the Bowen cabin to a parking spot as was used historically
prior to 2008," even though that decorative border was "several
feet back from the edge of [the Driveway]"; and (2) that the
Bowens remove "recently-grown foliage," apparently referring
to foliage and trees that had grown within the circle
encompassed by the Driveway after the 1950s to 1970s when
there had been "very little tree growth in [the Driveway]."
11

<_[64

The Bowens argue that the orders relating to the
decorative border, the walkway, and the foliage "place
additional, and equally impermissible, burdens on the Bowens'
property" because those orders "all granted the Judds rights in
excess of those they enjoyed during the prescriptive period" and
"prescriptive rights cannot include any right to prevent the
Bowens from marking the outer boundary of the driveway on
their own property" or "the right to force the Bowens to use a
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particular part of their own property" -the rock-bordered
walkway-"as a parking spot." They also argue that "the Judds
cannot enjoy any prescriptive rights in keeping the vegetation on
the Bowens' property in the same condition it was in the 1950s
and 1970s."

~

«jf65 We agree. These orders are inconsistent with the usage
that forms the basis of the Judds' prescriptive right-using the
Driveway for ingress and egress purposes. Rather, the court's
orders seem to be focused on resolving disputes over parking;
neither the walkway nor the decorative border impedes the
Judds from using the Driveway for access purposes. Indeed, the
trial court made no findings or conclusions to suggest that
removal of the decorative rock border or the walkway
improvements was reasonably necessary to permit the. Judds to
use the Driveway for access. See Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co.
v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah 1946) (stating that the standard
for establishing the dimensions of a prescriptive easement is that
which is of "reasonable necessity" to permit the limited use
acquired as a prescriptive right). And the Judds have not
directed us to any evidence that demonstrates such limitations
would be reasonably necessary to enable their limited rights of
access to their cabin. Indeed, it is difficult to see how they could
be, considering that the evidence describes both the rock border
and the walkway as outside of the Driveway's physical track.
Further, while the conversion of the Bowens' prior cabin-side
parking strip to a walkway reduced the Bowens' own dedicated
parking, with the result that Bowen cabin users would more
likely use the Driveway for parking, the Bowens' ownership
rights permit them to park on the Driveway so long as they do
not unreasonably interfere with the Judds' right of access to their
property. See Newell, 550 P.2d at 179 ("[I]t is to be realized that
the owner of the fee title, because of his general ownership,
should have the use and enjoyment of his property to the highest
degree possible, not inconsistent with the easement."). In other
words, the Bowens may choose to retain the walkway and park
on the Driveway under their rights of "general ownership," so
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long as they do not unreasonably interfere with the Judds'
ability to use the Driveway to access their property, as we have
discussed above.

cir 66 Finally, the trial court's order that the foliage in the
vicinity of the Driveway, including within the circle, be returned
to its 1950s to 1970s state seems largely directed at freeing up
additional parking area for the Judds' use consistent with the
court's declaration of a parking easement in their favor. Because
we have determined that no prescriptive parking easement
arose, there is no further basis for this order to the extent it
implicates parking concerns. And in this regard, it is not
apparent to what extent, if any, the court's foliage order may
have been concerned with the Judds' ability to use their right of
access over the Driveway. There does not seem to be any
evidence, for example, that since the 1970s the growth of foliage
has prevented the Judds from using the Driveway to access their
property; to the contrary, testimony at trial established that both
the Judds and the Bowens have continued to use the Driveway
for access purposes since the 1970s, even with the increased
foliage. Nevertheless, given the way that conflict over the
common ·use of the Driveway has evolved in more recent
history, it would not be unreasonable for the trial court to
impose some restraints on the growth of foliage aimed at
preventing interference with the Judds' ability to drive over the
Driveway for purposes of reasonable access to their property, for
example, in order to prevent encroaching foliage that might
damage passing vehicles or interfere with their reasonable
passage. See Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, cir 31, 186 P.3d 978
(noting that the dimensions of a prescriptive right are not limited
to a historic beaten path, but are instead dictated by reasonable
necessity). Rather, some requirement that the Bowens maintain
the foliage bordering the Driveway so that it does not
unreasonably interfere with safe passage could be a basis for
resolution, but we will leave the details to the trial court, which
is better suited to resolve them than we are. Such an order
should be designed ·to preserve the Judds' limited right to use
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the Driveway for access and balance that limited use against the
Bowens' superior ownership right.
<JI67 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in ordering restoration of the walkway on the Bowens'
property to a driveway and removal of any portion of the
decorative border or any foliage that does not impede the Judds'
reasonable access over the Driveway.

CONCLUSION
<JI68 We affirm the trial court's award to the Judds of a
prescriptive easement over the Driveway for the purpose of
access to their cabin. As the trial court ordered, the Bowens must
refrain from actions that would unreasonably interfere with that
easement. However, we reverse the court's determination that
the Judds are entitled to a prescriptive easement for parking on
the Bowens' property. Under the circumstances of this case, we
conclude that the doctrine of prescriptive easement is
inconsistent with the parking right asserted by the Judds and
with the Bowens' ownership rights.
cit:69 We also vacate the court's orders that the Bowens remove
the decorative rock border and the walkway as those orders do
not appear to be reasonably necessary to the Judds' enjoyment of
their access easement. Finally, we vacate the court's order to cut
back the foliage to the growth consistent from the 1950s to 1970s.
Rather, the Bowens must keep the foliage trimmed so that it does
not unreasonably interfere with the Judds' access easement.
<JI70 We recognize that there may be some need to further
address in the trial court the details of the parties' interactions to
take into account the practical implications of our decision, and
we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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ORME, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
<_{[71

I concur in the court's opinion except for its treatment of

parking. Under the circumstances, the Judds' right to park on the
Driveway was not akin to a possessory or ownership interest in
land. It was, instead, a transitory, occasional intrusion. At least
that is what the evidence established, and to the extent the trial
court gave the Judds a more expanded parking right than was
warranted by their historical usage-i.e., the right to park on the
Driveway so long as it did not impede the Bowens' use of the
Driveway and to move any obstructing vehicles upon the
Bowens' request-the court must amend its decree accordingly.
<_1[72 By the same token, in my view the trial court should
revisit its subsequent decree and scale back its directives to the
Bowens so that the decree requires only the least intrusive
restrictions necessary to preserve the limited parking right
enjoyed over the decades by the Judds. This surely will not
include the mandate to return the Bowens' decorative walkway
to its prior condition as a parking spot reserved for the Bowens'
use, but it may well include limited directions vis-a-vis foliage
and the rock wall if those effectively deprive the Judds of their
historical ability to park on the Driveway in such a way as to
minimize the Bowens' need to ask them to move.
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